Engineer Memoirs
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under me six Korean and two United States divisions. I was supported by U.S.
atomic artillery-an Honest John battalion.
Shortly after I arrived, I was told that the U.S. Army and the Joint Chiefs of Staff
were considering phasing out one of the two U.S. divisions under my command.
I was to recommend whether the 2d Division or the 7th Division should be phased
out. I was also to study whether we could turn the artillery mission over to the
Koreans.
My recommendation was that the 2d Division should stay since it occupied the
more important sector to defend.
I also said that if we were going to phase out a U.S. division that the ratio of seven
Korean to one U.S. division called for a different command structure. We, of
course, wanted to maintain overall control, and in fact the Koreans wanted us to
continue to be in command. It was their way of assuring U.S. direct involvement
in combat if the North Koreans attacked. My recommendation was that we should
change I Corps from a U.S. corps to a joint corps headquarters which would still
leave me in command. My deputy would be a Korean and we would have a staff
which was half Korean and half U.S. The U.S. corps headquarters at Uijongbu
would be replaced by an integrated US/ROK [United States/Republic of Korea]
headquarters. I also recommended turning the artillery mission over to the
Koreans.
The idea struck a responsive chord with the Koreans and the Americans. To work
up the plans for an integrated staff, the Koreans assigned me a very fine major
general, Lee Jae Jon. Subsequently Lee was promoted to lieutenant general and
became deputy commander of I
Corps.
Our planning proceeded along several simultaneous avenues. The first involved
phasing out one of our U.S. divisions and placing elements of the remaining one
in the most strategic areas. The best Korean division would move into the next
most strategic areas and the new Korean division would move into the easier sector
to defend. The second avenue was to train Korean artillery to take over the Honest
John battalion which would fire, if needed, the atomic weapons which we would
keep under U.S. control. The third avenue was to design an integrated
Korean-United States staff. The planning and execution would be done without
any detriment to our mission or our state of alertness.
The phaseout of the U.S. division and its replacement by a Korean division went
smoothly. So did the training of the Korean artillery. However, the transition of
the corps headquarters into an integrated one went less smoothly. This was not
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