Edward L. Rowny
rotated among the services. When Burchinal, an Air Force officer, took command,
he was assigned a Navy admiral as chief of staff and asked Polk to provide an
Army deputy chief of staff. There was no love lost between Polk and Burchinal.
Polk didn't like the way Burchinal had operated in the past and was undiplomatic
to the extent of telling him that he was sending me to his command because he
knew that "Rowny will keep you honest."
As a result, I was sent to Stuttgart under difficult circumstances. Although I was
loyal to Burchinal and did not tell tales out of school, I was suspected by Burchinal
of doing so.
Still, despite these unhappy circumstances, I would say that I got along reasonably
well with Burchinal. My job, for the most part, involved overseeing the planning
for contingencies. As it happened, it was an exciting time because the Soviets
chose that year to invade Czechoslovakia.
Q ..
Did Washington know the Soviets would invade?
We predicted that the Soviets would invade Czechoslovakia and submitted reports
A
along those lines to Washington. You will recall that the Soviets said they were
simply on maneuvers and would not invade Czechoslovakia. Washington,
unfortunately, took the Soviets at their word. Burchinal thought that the U.S.
troops in NATO should go on a higher state of alert. He made the mistake,
however, of asking Washington's permission rather than doing what was necessary.
Washington, not wanting to "provoke- the Soviets by making aggressive moves,
turned down Burchinal's requests. As a result, radars were not moved forward and
reconnaissance flights along the border were not stepped up. If the Soviets had not
stopped in Czechoslovakia but had continued to move against Germany, NATO's
forces would have been placed at a serious tactical disadvantage.
This mistake of not doing what was necessary but first seeking Washington's
approval was one that had been made once before. Burchinal should have learned
a lesson from our previous experience. I refer to the time, several years earlier,
when the Soviets began to erect the Berlin Wall. It is my belief that the Soviets
initially were only testing our resolve. If we had moved promptly to dismantle the
wall when it was started, I think the Soviets would have backed down. But instead,
our U.S. commander referred the matter to Washington. Not wanting to risk a
clash, the U.S. administration issued orders that the erection of the wall was not
to be opposed. I pointed this out to Burchinal, but he wanted to play it safe and
referred the question of putting U.S. troops on a higher state of alert to
Washington. The reply he got was predictable; we did nothing.
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