Most of my work had to do with the Army's acquisition process. DCSR&D
A
[deputy chief of staff for research and development] played a large role helping
decide what new equipment the Army should buy, what old equipment warranted
being scrapped and what new equipment needed extensive testing and improvement
before it was produced in quantity.
I was also in charge of the 40 or so Army laboratories that did research and
development for the Army's food, clothing, weapons, ammunition, radios, tanks,
and vehicles. In this job I was required to work closely with the Army Science
Advisory Board [ASAB] and the Department of Defense Office of Research and
Development [DOD R&D].
Q ..
Did your work in R&D entail continuing to develop equipment for Vietnam?
A ..
No. Most of the research and development on equipment for Vietnam had already
been done, and in fact was winding down. We were continuing to work on
equipment for a leaner, more durable and lighter Army division. Working in close
coordination with the Army Science Advisory Board we were trying to follow the
Soviets' lead and stamp out rugged equipment which could be cheaply
mass-produced. We made numerous studies to determine whether time between
overhaul on radios, weapons, and vehicles would be shorter if we developed spare
parts of higher quality or produced ones of lesser quality and simply threw them
away instead of trying to repair them.
We also spent considerable effort on reducing the time required for maintenance.
This applied largely to helicopters, which were notorious for a high maintenance
to use ratio, but also for vehicles, armored personnel carriers, and tanks. We tried
to design equipment which could be serviced by a user, rather than a mechanic.
For example, we reduced the number of parts that needed to be lubricated on a
vehicle by 50 percent. Our goal was to make maintenance as quick and easy as
possible.
Q ..
What about the Army's laboratories? What did management of them involve?
A.
My work with the Army's labs was of two types. The first type was to assure that
they were working on items the Army needed, and not simply spending time and
money on pet projects, some of which were not feasible, and others which were not
needed. A number of labs had "hobby horse" programs which were interesting,
but not very useful. Because of the ingrained habits which many scientists
developed, and because pay was not as good as the better scientists could get in
civilian laboratories, directing and keeping them was a difficult job.
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