because there were any substantive matters between us, but because there were
many administrative hurdles to overcome.
It was my thought that if we were to become a truly integrated staff we would not
only have to work together but to live together. Since U.S. officers were not
allowed to have their families in Korea and the Koreans of course did, the first
question was whether to permit families to live with both the U.S. and Korean
officers or to have families with neither side. I didn't think we could allow Korean
officers to have their families live with them and the U.S. officers not do so. The
Koreans opted not to have their families join them. The second question was
where to house the Korean officers. My thought was that the Korean officers
would move into the same housing vacated by the U.S. officers. But I immediately
ran into administrative difficulties. The United States Army said, "No," we and
the Koreans should have separate housing and not live together. I resisted this but
lost out. In the end we struck a compromise. The deputy commander and
principal staff officers would live among the Americans. But the other officers and
enlisted men of the headquarters would live in separate buildings within our
compound.
Q ..
Did you have general resistance to your idea or was it the resistance of only a few?
A
I had general resistance from the administrators at the Army headquarters in Korea
as well as widespread resistance from Washington. They didn't like the idea of
providing jeeps and sedans for Korean officers and of allowing the Koreans to eat
in our mess. I took the stand that if we were to live together and perhaps have to
fight and die together, then the Korean officers should eat in our mess.
But the U.S. administrators had objections. They said our messes were subsidized
and therefore the Koreans should pay full amounts for their meals, a large sum of
money for the Koreans. They would have to give up almost their entire salary in
order to be able to eat with us. Then there were other objections. The critics said
.
we would have to set up two kitchens, that the Koreans wouldn't eat our food.
And our headquarters invented other arguments and imposed additional obstacles.
In the end General Lee Jae Jon convinced the Korean Army that they should
reimburse the U.S. for meals eaten by the Korean officers. The Koreans would
provide kitchens for Korean enlisted men. A compromise was worked out.
We grew to be a very closely integrated staff after that, I think in large part
because the Korean officers and enlisted men saw how hard I fought to consider
them equals. They worked very hard as a staff. At our officers mess we had two
mess lines, one for U.S. food and one for Korean food. Each line had one or two
dishes from the other line. But we sat together at the tables. The Korean enlisted
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