Engheer Memoirs
The second type of work, closely related to the first, was the management of the
labs. Most of them had been staffed with good scientists during World War II, but
only a few were able to bring in new, younger scientists. My self-appointed task
was to determine why some labs were able to recruit and keep innovative scientists
and others were not. In some cases it was a matter of just how good the chief
scientist was. In other cases it was a matter of associating the lab with a nearby
university. For example, labs developing laser range finding equipment worked
closely with MIT in Boston. Another, the Harry Diamond Lab, worked closely
with the University of Pennsylvania.
Five or six of the labs were superior. Another five or six were very poor. The
others were in between. The challenge was to find out what made the better ones
good and to try to bring the poorer ones up to a higher standard.
In part, the overall performance of a lab had to do with what was, and in some
cases what was not, being developed in civilian life.
Q ..
This sounds like a paradox. Can you explain?
A ..
Yes. In the late 1960s there was a great deal of emphasis in the private sector on
developing smaller computers. The Harry Diamond Laboratory, one of the Army's
best, had pioneered in etched circuitry. But then the lab began experimenting with
printed circuitry. As a result, there was a great deal of synergism with such
companies as IBM and TRW on jointly developed programs.
An example of the second type was the Army lab which developed food. The
Army's Natick Laboratory pioneered in food research whereas the civilian sector
spent very little money on developing food products; commercial food producers
spent almost no money on R&D. The Natick Lab developed such products as
powdered milk and dehydrated eggs. They were the first to develop freeze-dried
coffee which became a multimillion dollar business in the United States. Natick
also pioneered in radiating meat so it could be kept in storage for months without
refrigeration.
All in all, the management of the Army labs was a fascinating part of my
experience. I like to think I raised the performance of some of them. One
technique I used was to take the chiefs of some of the poorer labs with me when
I inspected the better ones. By observing how the top labs were able to perform
well, the poorer ones benefitted. Another technique was to offer cash incentives
to the scientists who developed the best ideas. When we received additional funds
for R&D, instead of spreading the money evenly, I held out some to reward the
Previous Page
