________________________________________________________________________Richard S. Kem
Q:
Do you think it's going to have a favorable reading, though, to the new Chief of Staff, who
himself has been involved with it before, when it gets there?
A:
I think so. I think General Vuono commanded a mech infantry division; he's the architect of
recognizes that this engineer piece is broken, and because of the fact it does not cause more
manpower spaces, it's not a big bill payer requirement for the Army. What we badly need is
concept approval so we can go work out the details of stationing the rest of it, which will
have some minor bills, certainly minor in terms of force modernization paid for in other
battlefield systems. So, I think he will. We still have some staff detractors here and about, but
I emphasize once again, the leaders who understand maneuver all solidly support it. People
with NTC experience know we've got to have it. So, the places where we have the pockets of
resistance are typically those who don't understand maneuver or have problems with not
having been at the NTC.
Q:
So, the real problem would arise in staff or with, say, materiel development, new equipment,
where the Army budget's going to have to be sliced differently for research and development
and acquisition, and somebody's going to have to lose something?
A:
Well, anytime you put something together like this, you always have the difficulty in boiling
down the number of Vu-Graphs or slides for the high level of person you're briefing while
still putting in enough slides so that you have the level of detail necessary for all the
questions. We've analyzed EForce from every dimension. Nevertheless, you'll find people
out there who can't believe we don't need more people for this concept. Most of those people
are staff level; they haven't served in a division or were in a division who once again believe
that the only engineers you get are the ones in the organic divisional engineer battalion and
who don't understand today's concept of Corps battalions coming in OPCON to support.
The fact is, even with this concept, we're keeping 50 percent of our engineers at Corps and
we're still rolling one Corps battalion into the division. So, we've analyzed it to show there is
no force structure gain, no more spaces gained, no officer gain. And, in fact, in terms of
modernization, taking things that are already in the Army program, we require less
modernized equipment for EForce than we do for today's force because our today's concept
that says we're going to have two Corps battalions that may at any time go fight in that
division, you have to modernize all of them. We're only converting one of the Corps
battalions and rolling it into the division, so we need less equipment. Key to that is the fact
that we see everything in the divisional engineers forward of the brigade's rear boundary
being totally mechanized like its infantry/armor counterparts. Behind the brigade's rear
boundary we'll have all wheeled engineers. Consequently, in fact, we need less equipment
and modernization.
There is one exception to that, and that is the Army's glaring weakness in countermine. We
don't have a heavy force breacher. We still, after all these years, rely on bayonets and are
getting the mine-clearing line charge. We badly need a breacher--that is, something with a
full-width plow that can go out under fire and move the mines aside. We don't have that in
the Army program. We would like to have that in EForce. We right now have the combat
337