Engineer Memoirs _____________________________________________________________________
together an action plan that we will mail out and begin briefing around shortly. Part of that
study is an addressable threat. I think one of the things we have to do is ensure that those in
the United States Army and those who are concerned with our ability to fight integrated
combined arms understand that threat to our ability to maneuver.
Q:
Do you think that that is generally true, that they do understand the Soviet threat as far as its
capabilities in the engineer area?
A:
No, I don't think that is true. I think that part of the threat is not well understood. That's
come out as we briefed during the countermine initiative. We had people on the general
officer steering committee who represented the major TRADOC schools--Infantry, Armor,
Artillery, Aviation were all there. General Tait, Armor School, came several times. We had
the Combined Arms Center represented. We had the Army Staff and General [John W.]
Woodmansee from Operations and Plans and General [Robert] Molinelli from Research,
Development, and Acquisition. We had field units--General Andy Cooley from the 24th
Division, light division folks, and the 5th Mech Division sent an assistant deputy chief. We
had quite a number of people addressing the problem, and typically many were surprised
with what threat was still there.
We find as the "threat" is briefed about the Army, it typically focuses on weapons systems
that kill by direct fire and doesn't really address the threat in terms of our ability to maneuver
against it. You won't find many statements or briefings on the threat that address their
capabilities for mine warfare. So, as part of our countermine initiative, one of the things
proposed by the general officers steering committee is that we get the Army to adopt and
validate the threat in this arena. One of the chapters in the study we're putting together
addresses threat capabilities, and we will seek to have that be incorporated as part of the
threat, to improve overall understanding. So, the answer to your question is, "No, I don't
think the Army understands the threat to maneuver, really understands our Soviet threat's
capability of thwarting our ability to maneuver."
Q:
That's really critical to operations on the battlefield, isn't it?
A:
Absolutely.
Q:
We're sitting there and don't understand what he can do.
A:
Absolutely.
Q:
You mentioned the M9 ACE earlier. Describe your involvement with it while you were
commandant.
A:
The M9 ACE was a major focus of my activity from the day I became commandant until the
end of my tour and afterward. At the 1984 Engineers Functional Review, Major General Ellis
pitched the need to continue the M9 program in spite of a challenge by the Operational Test
and Evaluation Agency that it did not meet requirements for fielding. At a lunch showdown
that day General Thurman directed a follow-on field evaluation of the M9 versus the D7
dozer tractor-trailer system. That started weeks of hassling with the Operational Test and
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