Engineer Memoirs _____________________________________________________________________
and we convinced him that we should keep the original design. So, we proceeded with that
design after that. However, time with General Richardson on deck as TRADOC commander
ran out, and we did not proceed with the concept to the Chief of Staff of the Army at that
time.
General Vuono then came back to be TRADOC commander. Basically, with the many
changes of personnel throughout the year, we had to start over briefing a new Forces
Command commander; a new Combined Arms commander, General [Gerald T.] Bartlett; a
new Armor School commandant, General [Thomas H.] Tait. Therefore, we went back on the
road to go around and touch the bases again and brief the EForce concept. General Bartlett
became a very solid supporter, as did General Tait. Throughout, those TRADOC
commandants associated with maneuver gave EForce strong support; that is, RisCassi and
Bartlett at the Combined Arms Center, Tait at the Armor School, [Edwin H.] Burba at the
Infantry School, [Frederick M., Jr.] Franks at the Command and General Staff College--in
other words, the doctrine guy at Fort Leavenworth--and Charlie Ottstott, the new
commander at CACDA [Combined Arms Combat Development Activity].
In February I talked with General Vuono, who then felt that in the waning months of General
Wickham's time as Chief of Staff, it was inappropriate to take other new things forward. So,
it continues now with one remaining piece of EForce not implemented. That is, we've done
the echelons above Corps, those engineers who work in the communications zone. We've
done the light force. The heavy force engineers part of the EForce remains to be taken
forward under, once again, a new regime--General Reno, General Max Thurman, General
Bartlett's still a strong supporter--back up to the Chief of Staff.
Q:
Should things like that be held back because of those changes or should they go forward
anyway? I mean, it's a significant, very significant change to take place, isn't it?
A:
I think they should go forward anyway, but the realities are that to make things work, you've
got to sign folks up. We needed a consensus, and so consensus building was a great part of
the effort. It was not difficult because the consensus was already there: the engineer part of
the combined arms team was broken. I found that the maneuver folks were looking for an
engineer who agreed that it was broken and would come up with a plan to fix it, and fix it in
their terms--maneuver terms. Having done that, then the many comments we got back from
infantrymen, the tankers, and the artillery as we went about in the combined arms arena
allowed us to refine the concept so that we got a package that everybody solidly felt was
needed at the levels we work in--that is, divisions, TRADOC, FORSCOM, USAREUR.
Yet, when you approach the Department of the Army level, you approach people who worry
in terms of dollars and bigger agendas and how things work in the bigger arena. So, it's easy
to say, "Yes, they should proceed right ahead," but you do have to keep your consensus
together and ensure that you are going to be receptive at the top. The feeling was that General
Wickham, like a lot of people, very naturally had a plate full of agenda items he was trying to
wrestle to the ground before he left, and there wasn't time for new ones.
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