Engineer Memoirs _____________________________________________________________________
organization to get the engineers at the point of battle when they're needed and not to have to
be called up and not have to send back for what was needed.
It was revolutionary from the standpoint of people changing their thinking, if they were
academicians. It's evolutionary when you've been out there on that battlefield and you know
what you need as a maneuver commander and you know when you don't get it. You know
it's available back there somewhere, but you just can't quite get it.
In about October 1985, Colonel Chris Conrad, who had been a brigade commander in the 4th
Infantry Division with a lot of NTC experience, wrote a two- or three-page think piece that
really hit home on what was wrong with the engineer part of the combined arms team. He
said things like, "Engineers could be the most valuable contributor to combat power in the
brigade, but we seldom use their full potential." He said things like, "We've got enough
engineers, we just don't have them put together right." He initially said, "What I want is that
engineer company attached to me." His thinking was, "Give it to me; I can make it work."
We had him out along with some other armor and infantry commanders because we were
putting together our concept or fleshing out our thinking on how this division engineer
should be organized. We had all of them to Fort Belvoir and did a lot of talking around. He
said, "No, I recognize my paper was at fault. I really want that company for every task force.
I want them to tie in together at the brigade. That's what I should have, and it just doesn't
work the way it is. I've gone out to the NTC with a Corps type of company along with my
divisional company. I want all engineers organic to the division, and I need a battalion
element for my brigade."
So, with that and with his help and the help of these other maneuver commanders, we then
fleshed out our concept and began briefing that throughout the Army to division
commanders, to the Combined Arms Center, and to General Richardson. [See Appendix C.]
It was widely accepted by those we briefed. Anybody who had been to the NTC knew it was
right. We had lieutenant colonels and colonels with NTC experience tell us--when asked the
question, "Can you use it now or do we wait until we get the modern equipment to go with
it?"--"Give it to me now. I'd go to the NTC and do a lot better right now with today's
equipment. It'll be even better with the modernized equipment; don't give up on that either."
We briefed around and never had a maneuver commander who did not agree with the
concept.
I took it back to General Richardson, who wanted us to evaluate the other alternatives. First,
address all the other alternatives from other staffers who thought you could do it this way or
that. We did that, and in every case EForce was the most effective option against all other
options measured in terms of effectiveness to the maneuver team. He asked us also, though,
to consider a fourth battalion in the division engineer organization. It was a regimental-sized
organization, but we didn't call it a regiment. I lost my train of thought.
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