Edward L. Rowny
Toward the end of the Malta meeting, Baker and Shevardnadze worked for three
hours trying to hammer out a joint communique on START that would show that
some progress had been made. But they got nowhere because, in fact, there had
been no progress.
In an otherwise gloomy atmosphere, there was one glimmer of hope. Some
movement had taken place on one of President Bush's pet issues: chemical
weapons. The two leaders pledged to end all production and to destroy almost all
existing stocks of chemical weapons within ten years. As insurance, Bush insisted
that the U.S. keep 500 tons of chemical weapons until all other countries capable
of producing such munitions signed an agreement banning them. This idea of
maintaining a stockpile did not sit well with critics, both abroad and at home.
Later, in May 1991, President Bush succumbed to media pressure and dropped his
insistence that the U.S. keep a stock of chemical munitions. In its place, he
adopted a policy that had a good ring to it as a public relations ploy but was still
quite safe. The United States would destroy all chemical stocks if the other
chemical-producing nations signed a verifiable treaty banning chemical weapons.
It was a safe proposal because no one would hold his breath until a treaty with
verifiable provisions could be worked out.
The two leaders did agree at Malta that Baker and Shevardnadze would meet in
January 1990 to tackle the three largest stumbling blocks in START: air-launched
cruise missile [ALCM] ranges and counting rules; non-deployed missiles; and
telemetry encryption.
When President Bush returned from Malta, I found that he had a new assignment
for me. This time, in addition to debriefing the three Asian countries-that is,
Japan, Korea and Australia (I did not go to China because Tiananmen Square was
still fresh in our minds)-the President sent me to Mexico and Brazil. His thought
was that the Latin America leaders felt that too much attention was being put on
European affairs and not enough on affairs in our own hemisphere.
My visits to Mexico and Brazil proved very profitable. I was especially impressed
by the youth and vigor of President Salinas of Mexico. In our preliminary
conversation, I told Salinas I had heard a rumor that his three young children were
attending Japanese schools in Mexico City. Salinas said it wasn't a rumor, that the
story was correct. When I asked him why he would send his children to a Japanese
school, his answer was, "Where else will they learn a good work ethic except in
a Japanese school?" To me it was a clear indication of Salinas' attitude toward
hard work and his determination to turn around the Mexican economy.
179
Previous Page
