A
The Bush administration was not certain where it wanted to go with a number of
its strategic programs. The biggest unanswered question was what to do about
land-based mobile systems. The Soviets had developed a rail-mobile system, the
SS-24s, about the size of our
which also carried 10 warheads on each
missile. The Soviets had several dozen SS-24s deployed, some on rail cars and
some in fixed silos. The Soviets had also developed and deployed several hundred
SS-25s. These were single warhead road mobile systems. The United States, on
the other hand, was still trying to decide how to deploy its M-X missile; whether
to place it on rail cars or deploy it in fixed silos. Secretary of Defense Cheney
favored the M-X on rail cars. National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft,
however, favored developing and deploying the Midgetman, our version of the
Soviet's single warhead road mobile system.
The Congress was also split. Some legislators favored a rail-mobile M-X; others
preferred the rail-mobile Midgetman. President Bush, always the great
compromiser and wishing to be "prudent," asked the Congress for funds to develop
both systems.
Another undecided question was the extent to which the U.S. should produce B-2
bombers. The B-2 was becoming more and more expensive. President Bush asked
the Congress for money for the 132 B-2s the Air Force said it required to cover
our SIOP [strategic integrated operational plan] targets. Congressional leaders said
they would back no more than 50. The difficulty with this was that 132 B-2s was
the number needed by the Air Force to cover the targets after we reduced the
specified number of missiles under the impending START agreement.
Thus, the United States was faced with a split within the administration and also
a split between the administration and the Congress.
About this time there was a week-long visit to the United States by Marshal Sergei
Akhromeyev. The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Crowe, had in-
vited Akhromeyev to the United States for a series of briefings and conversations.
He also offered him visits to Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps
installations. I did not tour the states with Akhromeyev but talked to the marshal
before he left the United States. On his last day, shortly before he left, I had an
hour-long private conversation with Akhromeyev.
Akhromeyev was highly impressed by what he saw at our Army training camps,
and especially by the razzle-dazzle of our special forces. He was also quite
impressed by the sophistication of our tanks and other equipment, and by the
caliber, state of training, and morale of our soldiers. He was given a ride in a B-2
and flew by computer at high speeds at 300 feet.
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