Engineer Memoirs
strategic defenses but will exploit our ambivalence by fanning anti-SD1 sentiment
in the United States.
My net impression of Akhromeyev was that he was a professional military man
who would strive to reform the Soviet armed forces. But at the same time, he was
a true believer in Communism who believed, like his patron Gorbachev, that the
system could, in time, be reformed.
Q ..
To get back to the pre-Malta preparations, I understand that Secretary of State
Baker and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze met in Wyoming in the fall of 1989.
Can you tell me something about that meeting?
A ..
Presidents Bush and Gorbachev apparently decided that it would be a good idea if
their foreign ministers had preliminary discussions prior to the principal getting
together. Accordingly, Baker invited Shevardnadze to Jackson Hole, Wyoming.
He thought that in such relaxed surroundings, away from their respective capitals,
they could have more extensive and more leisurely talks.
The weather cooperated, and in the late Indian summer, many of the meetings were
conducted out of doors. The Soviets were able to ride horseback, fish, and hike
on the trails of the great Western countryside. They thoroughly enjoyed
themselves. One of the Soviet experts commented on what a great country
America was. "Here in your Siberia," he said, "one can go to a supermarket and
buy fresh meat and vegetables and even frozen fish."
Another one of their experts wanted to take home some souvenirs. Approaching
a saleslady, he said, "Do you speak any Russian?" "No," she said. "I know only
one word: vodka." "Don't you know what perestroika is?" he asked. "No," she
said, "I'm a teetotaler."
The meetings on arms control, while not overly productive, were nevertheless
reported in an upbeat tone. Shevardnadze dropped his insistence that there be a
separate treaty on defense and space, which he had previously linked to a START
treaty. However, he built in one of the Soviets' typical loopholes. Linkage would
be dropped, he said, if "both sides would continue to comply with the ABM treaty
as signed in 1972." The Soviets, in other words, were harking back to their
insistence on the narrow interpretation of the ABM treaty. It was their way of
putting us on notice that they had no intention of abandoning their policy of stifling
the United States strategic defense developments.
Shevardnadze also said that the Soviets were willing to conclude an agreement on
sea-launched cruise missiles [SLCMs] separate from the actual START treaty.
176
Previous Page
