Engineer Memoirs
In Brazil I was received by the earetaker government. The president of Brazil had
died after he was elected and before he was to have taken office, and an unpopular
leader took over the government. Nevertheless, the Brazilian officials were cordial
and quite flattered that President Bush would send a personal envoy to meet with
them.
After the Malta meeting, it was obvious that Gorbachev and Bush were both
anxious to move ahead on CFE and START. As planned, Baker and Shevardnadze
met in Geneva in January 1990. However, no progress was made on arms control.
President Bush, observing the collapse of communism in Europe, made the mistake
of thinking that Gorbachev would rush to conclude a strategic arms agreement. He
made the further mistake of announcing that START would be initialed at a June
summit in 1990. He did not listen to the advice of those of us who had been
through the experience of SALT II. In the past, external events had put no
pressure on the Soviets to move towards arms agreements. There was little
evidence that the Soviets would change their habits. As in the past, setting a
deadline would only put U.S. negotiators under pressure to make concessions in
order to meet a deadline.
Despite my misgivings, the Washington summit was held from May 30 to June 3,
1990. As I had predicted in January, the meetings yielded no breakthroughs on
arms control. Determined to make it a significant public relations event, Bush
pulled a surprise by bringing up the issue of trade. The President, anxious to
bolster Gorbachev, gave him a concrete bonus to take home to the Soviet Union,
which was hemorrhaging economically. Bush modified his stand that he would not
sign a trade agreement until Gorbachev made concessions on other issues. Before
the summit, Bush had wisely announced that there would be no trade agreement
until the Soviet Union passed legislation codifying the right of the Soviet peoples
to emigrate freely and until there was a let-up of pressure on the Baltic states
seeking independence. Now, in his desire to prop up Gorbachev, the President was
retreating from his earlier conditions.
Gorbachev was grateful for Bush's help with his domestic problems. But this did
not cause him to be more forthcoming on arms control. The usual situation was
now reversed. Instead of the Soviets raising arms control, it was now the United
States that tried to get the Soviets to discuss it. Hoping to make some progress,
Bush attempted to engage Gorbachev in informal discussions on arms control.
Either because Gorbachev felt he stood to lose out in such encounters at this time,
or perhaps because his advisors were nervous about letting him act on his own,
Gorbachev shunned Bush's invitation for informal get-togethers. Gorbachev flatly
refused to go to Kennebunkport, Bush's Maine vacation home. Bush then tried to
get Gorbachev to spend several days with him at Camp David. Gorbachev would
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