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proposal. He did not get a unanimous opinion; most of his advisors said that he
could live with Gorbachev's proposal. But several of us told the President he was
doing the right thing by not accepting limits on our SDI program. He accepted our
recommendation. By late afternoon, it became obvious to Reagan that Gorbachev
was intent on killing our SDI program. Accordingly, Reagan proposed that they
adjourn and announce that substantial progress had been made in the START and
INF areas, but none on the ABM treaty.
Immediately after the meeting, Secretary Schultz held a press conference. Tired
and frustrated that no agreement had been reached on the ABM treaty and SDI
issue, and worried that Gorbachev might exploit the "elimination of all nuclear
weapons" issue, Schultz painted a dark picture. Only belatedly did he say that
substantial progress had been made on INF and START. The press honed in on
the negative aspects of the meeting and neglected its positive aspects.
Gorbachev, in his press conference, tried to exploit the "elimination of all
weapons" issue. But whereas he had been skillful in debating Reagan, he was less
clear in answering press queries. He appeared tired and confused. As a result he
failed to capitalize on the propaganda advantage we thought was his. The Western
press, used to short, crisp answers, got lost when Gorbachev went into
long-winded explanations. We felt that Gorbachev had saved us, but were still not
quite certain. We advised the President to report to the American people on
nationwide TV the following evening.
Following the President's address, during which Reagan did a masterful job of
emphasizing the positive aspects of Reykjavik, the press stories in the United States
turned around. By the end of the week, a nationwide poll indicated that 70 percent
of the American people approved of the way President Reagan had handled himself
at Reykjavik.
Q ..
What did you do after the Reykjavik meeting?
I left at once for Tokyo and then on to Seoul and Beijing to report on what had
A
happened. The original foreign press accounts of Reykjavik repeated the negative
stories filed the night before. However, the Japanese government took the
unprecedented step of running President Reagan's TV address live throughout all
of Japan. The great communicator had succeeded again. A Japanese poll
expressed a vote of confidence in the way the President had conducted himself at
Reykjavik. In Seoul, I met with President Chun. He told me he strongly
supported the way President Reagan had dealt with Gorbachev. In Beijing, there
was a distinct shift away from their previous criticism of the positions the United
States had taken at Reykjavik.
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