Edward L. Rowny
Throughout the fall of 1987, we continued to grind away on the details of the INF
treaty. The Soviets introduced new demands, such as insisting that the Pershing
missiles we had built and stored in the U.S. for the Germans, be destroyed. We
dug in our heels and reminded the Soviets that bilateral agreements with other
nations would not be affected by U.S.-Soviet agreements.
Failing to split us from our allies, the Soviets tried to link progress in INF to
concessions they wanted us to make on the ABM treaty, especially as it affected
our SDI program.
In late October, just five weeks before the scheduled Washington summit, there
were still 36 issues to be resolved. Unfortunately, we had reached an "agreement
in principle" with the Soviets and had set a date for the signing of the treaty. As
they had always done, the Soviets tried to exploit the situation and benefit by
employing eleven-hour negotiating tactics. They even resorted to making new
demands. Two weeks later, with three weeks left, there were 41 outstanding
issues, the Soviets had added five more.
Our INF negotiator, Mike Glitman, was working night and day in Geneva to get
the treaty ready. On their last Saturday in Geneva, the day before the team was
scheduled to leave Geneva, there were still four unresolved issues. That morning,
when Glitman went to the Soviet compound to try to resolve the remaining issues,
he was told that Alexi Obukhov, his opposite number, was not available. A
frustrated Glitman later learned that Obukhov had gone skiing. Not to be put off,
Glitman went back to the Soviet compound Saturday evening. He was told that
Obukhov was back, but was tired and would see Glitman Sunday morning.
On Sunday Glitman was able to hammer out three of the four remaining issues.
The last holdout concerned a photo of the SS-20 missile the Soviets had promised
us. Obukhov said there were no photos of the missile; that it was never displayed
outside its canister. He produced a photo of the canister but Glitman said it would
not do. The U.S. and Soviet teams nevertheless flew to Washington, the Soviets
promising that when they arrived in Washington they would turn over a photo of
the SS-20 When they arrived, the Soviets produced the same photo of the
canister.
That night an emergency session of our team and policy makers debated what to
do. The State Department considered it a trivial issue, one that should not hold up
the signing ceremony scheduled to take place on Tuesday. The Defense Depart-
ment thought otherwise-a promise was a promise. They argued that the Senate
would not readily ratify a treaty if promises had been broken. Secretary Schultz
decided to pass the issue up to Reagan for decision. Reagan made the decision
readily. He said, "No tickee, no laundry; no photo, no treaty?
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