Edward L. Rowny
respected our opinion and took our advice. He said that it was impractical to
reduce all nuclear weapons by the year 2000, that it must be an eventual goal.
Reagan, to our surprise, proved he could hold his own in a debate with Gorbachev.
He amazed us with his dexterity and his firmness. Reagan might just pull it off.
The discussion shifted to the unresolved issue of what to do about the ABM treaty.
Reagan tried to get Gorbachev to be precise on what he meant by "strengthening
the ABM treaty." Gorbachev said he meant that research on strategic defenses
should be confined to ground laboratories. Since the ABM treaty has nothing in
it concerning research, it confirmed our belief that Gorbachev wanted to make the
ABM treaty more restrictive than the treaty specified. Reagan, annoyed by
Gorbachev's stand on the ABM treaty, saw a way of diverting the argument away
from the main issue of eliminating all nuclear weapons. Reagan proposed that
there be an additional session that afternoon. It was now 1:30 p.m., one hour after
the meeting was to have concluded. They agreed to meet again at 3 p.m.
During lunch, President Reagan reviewed the situation with us, saying that two
main issues needed clearing up. First, had he made it clear to the Soviets that we
were willing to reduce ballistic missiles, but not all nuclear weapons, by 2000? We
said that he had made it clear to Gorbachev, but did not trust him. It was too great
an opportunity for Gorbachev not to exploit. He could appeal to world opinion that
Reagan had turned down his offer to eliminate all nuclear weapons. Reagan's
counter offer of eliminating only ballistic missiles might be lost on the public. We
discussed the second issue, whether or not the Soviets were serious about insisting
that our SDI research program be restricted to ground laboratories? We convinced
the President that Gorbachev was not seeking a reasonable solution but simply
trying to kill the U.S. SDI program.
When the two leaders resumed that afternoon, they held to their respective
positions. Gorbachev proposed that all nuclear weapons be reduced by the year
2000 and Reagan again made it clear that we proposed that only ballistic missiles
be reduced by 1996. Reagan reiterated that we must hold out some nuclear
weapons until the conventional imbalance had been redressed. Reagan went to
great lengths to make his position clear. But Gorbachev would not acknowledge
that he understood. The possibility remained that Gorbachev would try to
embarrass Reagan publicly.
On the issue of "strengthening the ABM treaty," Gorbachev repeated that he
wanted to restrict strategic defense research to ground laboratories. Reagan called
a recess and once again reviewed the situation with us. The President asked us
what questions he should put to Gorbachev to smoke out whether he was seeking
a reasonable solution or simply trying to kill our SDI program. Reagan asked each
of us in turn whether he could safeguard U.S. interests by accepting Gorbachev's
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