his proposal public. Clearly, the Soviets were making an offer only for its effect
on world opinion. Gorbachev also proposed that only U.S. intermediate-range
missiles in Europe be reduced and not also British or French missiles. This, if it
came to pass, would be a monumental breakthrough.
The dilemma facing Reagan was how to deal with Gorbachev's proposal. Should
it be dismissed simply as a propaganda ploy? Or would it be better to counter it
with a concrete, detailed U.S. proposal? The President chose the second approach.
As a result, we developed with great care a reply designed to smoke out whether
the Soviets were indeed serious about eliminating all nuclear weapons. We also
welcomed the prospect of eliminating intermediate-range missiles.
Q.
What happened at Reykjavik?
l
A
In Reykjavik, true to form, Gorbachev tried to brush aside subjects related to the
East-West relationship and to deal only with arms control. Once again, Reagan
insisted that his broad agenda, includingregional issues and human rights, be
discussed. Despite repeated attempts byReagan to engage Gorbachev on the broad
agenda, Reagan did not succeed.
When the two leaders got around to arms control, Gorbachev repeated the proposal
he had made in January that all strategic nuclear weapons be eliminated. He also
said that the Soviets were prepared to talk in detail about START and INF.
Reagan suggested that arms control experts get together that evening.
When we sat down in Hofdi House at 8 p.m. Saturday night, October 10,1986,
there were several surprises. The first was the composition of the Soviet team.
Whereas our team consisted of the same members who had attended the previous
experts' sessions, the Soviets showed up with almost an entirely new team. The
one exception was Karpov. This time their team was headed by Marshal Sergei
Akhromeyev, the deputy defense minister and chief of the general staff of the
Soviet armed forces. Two others were well-known Soviet officials heavily
involved in Soviet public relations and propaganda: Georgi Arbatov and Feydor N.
Fallin. Their top expert on space systems, Feydor Velikov, was at the table, as
was their ambassador to the U.S., Yuli Dubinin. It was obvious from the outset
that the Soviets would use the Reykjavik meetings as grist for their public relations
and propaganda mills.
When I saw Marshal Akhromeyev at the table, I knew at once that the Soviets had
come to Reykjavik prepared to deal. I had been involved in a similar situation
once before, in Moscow in March 1977. When the Soviets were ready to move
ahead in the SALT negotiations, they brought in Marshal Nikolai Ogarkhov. It
--
156
Previous Page
