Carroll H. Dunn
since the Saudis provided the total funding. Later on, toward the end of this period, the
Post Office [now the U.S. Postal Service] construction task was assigned.
One of the early actions was the establishment of the Construction Engineering
Research Laboratory
in Champaign, Illinois. This idea had been fairly well
developed but hadn't been finalized. Working out the final leasing arrangements for its
support with the University of Illinois was required. There were also discussions as to
possible reorganization and realignment of activities, but these were continuing
questions requiring consideration and recommendations. In retrospect, I would say that
the period was one (other than the support of Vietnam and the Saudi commitment) of
routine actions without many new or major changes. I did become convinced that our
small-sized nuclear power program was not going anywhere, and I worked to close it
out. The small reactor nuclear power program really had no mission after the
completion of the
as a floating power barge.
Q ..
At Fort Belvoir?
A ..
The final results were handled at Fort Belvoir, but the program had been ongoing since
the middle 1950s. In Vietnam we had raised the question of using the nuclear power
barge to meet a part of our electrical requirements. The U.S. ambassador, for political
reasons, vetoed bringing any atomic power into Vietnam. Based on this experience, use
of the
was to be a continuing problem.
Q ..
That was the basic reason?
A ..
That was one of the considerations. That, plus the fact that with all of the restraints,
restrictions, and safety precautions related to nuclear power, there is no place on earth
where you could not run an equivalent oil-fueled power plant more cheaply than you
could a small nuclear plant. Therefore, the whole basis on which the program had
started, as far as I could determine, had changed. And the current situation no longer
justified the level of effort it required.
Q ..
Were you indicating, when you were talking about the Saudi commitment at the
beginning, that this perhaps was a drain?
It was a drain on the Corps' resources at a time when we were restricted in availability
A
of qualified people. While they were paying the dollar cost, we were still providing the
trained people. The question was how long it could, or should go on. Later, while I was
deputy chief General Clarke and I protested to the State Department that this wasn't
really an appropriate mission for the Corps. They insisted that, as a matter of diplomatic
relations, as long as the Saudis were, [the State Department was] strongly in favor of