Carroll H. Dunn
I thought the difference depended on whether or not the Vietnamese themselves could
ever reach the point where they could take over. The major effort of the U.S. forces in
the approach to the Vietnamese, both militarily and politically, was to try to increase
their input into the war. I felt at this point that what would actually happen was going
to depend largely on whether we were successful in changing the hearts and minds of
the Vietnamese people to make them take on, in full measure, their own responsibilities.
Looking back on it, I was not overly surprised at what happened in the early
although I would not have foretold the disaster that actually occurred. I would
summarize by saying it was the wrong war at the wrong place. And we did a very poor
job, as a nation, of making up our minds, once we got in it, to do what was necessary
to win it. Consequently, the results were not too unexpected. That is not a criticism of
individuals, particularly those in Vietnam. It's a question of the national will.
We expended'a great effort and lost many lives and resources for a very, very limited
result. I did anticipate that our construction of ports, roads, and airfields would
represent a material asset to the Vietnamese after we were gone. Obviously, I didn't
mean the North Vietnamese!
But it nevertheless has been an asset.
A
Probably.
.
Q
Can you think of any other aspects of the whole Vietnam situation that you'd like to
touch on?
A
Well, I think, essentially, we weren't prepared for what we took on. We decided to
send troops before we were prepared to receive them. And we were very, veryhesitant
to discard peacetime methods and to get on with decisive actions. I think thiwas the
s
big deficiency of the Vietnam experience. There was a feeling when we became
involved that all we had to do was growl. Obviously, this just didn't work.
Q.
Are there any individuals who haven't been mentioned who were outstanding
contributors?
A
I think everybody who was there did everything they could to make the best of a bad
situation. I don't have any criticism of or desire to single out any individual. A lot of
good people did a lot of good work, but the short tours and constant change of
personnel were very adverse factors. Yet, from my experience in World War II, I have
to say that I think the one-year rotation was a proper policy, particularly in the
environment of Vietnam and in view of the fact that a relatively few were carrying the
whole load. I think it would have been wrong to have kept people longer. So far as I
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