Engineer Memoirs
moment every project was in non-compliance, and new starts suddenly found
themselves at the foot of a steep climb which was obscured by the uncertainty of how
to proceed to the top. Seven years later President Carter announced his famous "hit
list" which, in spite of how it seemed to many, had the cleansing effect of forcing once
and for all a total review of every project. This review put to rest the many questions
about old projects and allowed attention to turn to newer problems. In the meantime,
several projects were stopped, to include the Cross Florida Barge Canal; scores
challenged, delayed and often changed, L&D 26, Truman, New Melones,
Tombigbee, Gallipolis, etc.; court cases flourished;
became a household word;
costs rose; and the decentralized character of doing business constrained as regulatory
and permit requirements grew. NEPA even spawned a Brookings Institute study of the
Federal activities to determine: "Can Organizations Change?" Since the programmatic
system had changed, the management had to adjust or lose. Gen. Fred Clarke, then
Chief of the Corps of Engineers, saw the need and, because of the unique
military/civilian organizational character of the Corps of Engineers, was able to
redirect policy and indoctrinate new Corps District and Division leaders quickly and
accordingly. The changes which ensued within the Army Corps of Engineers have
impacted the agency structure and procedures from top to bottom and these changes
have been felt and have left their imprint throughout the entire water resource
management scene both in the U.S. and, to some extent, worldwide.
Two side effects grew out of the NEPA.
First was the flurry of effort to challenge the authority of the executive
agencies to proceed with various elements of the water program. Lock and Dam
26 was delayed on the authority issue as much as environmental; the final court
case on the Tennessee-Tombigbee was founded in the exercise of authority by
the Secretary of the Army; the Cross Florida Barge Canal provided the platform
for testing the President's authority to impound congressionally appropriated
monies. These ordeals in themselves, while painful, have clarified the future of
using executive authority to implement certain existing water resource or
related laws.
. Second, the economic factors used to justify projects had a new
effects. These partners did not always get along too
well; however, what appeared to be an "unfriendly" takeover early in 1970's
has evolved into a rather smooth affiliation in the mid-1980's.
Environmental policy slowed water resource development, and the follow-on
attitudes toward traditional national economic policy for water programs stopped the
program cold. Only within the past year has legislation containing new investment
criteria given us reason to look for resumption of new water resource work.
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