Enaineer Memoirs
Well, back to the basic point. The hydropower study indicated that we could easily more than
double the present hydroelectric power output in the United States by improving the
efficiency of turbines in our existing projects, adding turbines to existing projects, and
developing certain low-head projects. That was a good report. It hasn't been executed and
probably never will be since the energy situation has improved. The need for the hydropower
may have diminished but there is, in this country, an opportunity for increased hydropower.
On the navigation study, as discussed earlier, you recall, while director of Civil Works I asked
that we develop a first-class water transportation system for the United States.
We needed to determine standard shape and size of a good waterway. We had 9-foot channels,
channels,
locks,
locks, as I recall-the depth over the sill varied,
as did the radii of curvature on curves. In other words, the criterion varied to the point that we
needed a standard against which every project would be designed.
We also felt that we needed to know a little bit more about the movement of the traffic and
the relationship between the waterways and the trains and the highways. Where were the
future tonnages going to come from on the waterways, et cetera?
Well, that was a good study. Unfortunately it became quite involved, and I am not sure it
answered the original question and produced a simple drawing that showed the waterways,
where we could extend them, which ones we could get rid of, and a cross-section of a properly
designed channel, et cetera.
The next thing, then, was flood control. So I asked simply for a list of the 10 or 20 worst flood
conditions in the United States. It turned out we didn't have a great number. The Santa
River in Los Angeles was number one on the list. That's being fixed now. We always knew
we had trouble on the upper Mississippi if we had floods that exceeded the design plan.
Sacramento also has a flood risk of major proportions.
Overall we had a good look into the future, and it turned out there wasn't all that much out
there. We had to finish up what we had, and there were only a few new projects. Basically,
it told us that the public works program as we've known it all these years was changing. It
wasn't over, but almost, and it was changing. That meant that the Corps should think about
other things.
While all this was going on, you realize, there were constraints being placed on our personnel
strength. Going back to my days as director of Civil Works, I did not think the Corps of
Engineers should perform any functions that could be performed by the American business
community. The federal government shouldn't be operating hopper dredges if we could find
companies that could do the same work and could pay them to do it. Economics are involved,
but the principle is okay.
Among the more "political" efforts was the program to privatize the hopper dredging activity
of the Corps. Following visits to the Corps' dredging program in the Northwest and along the
Southeast and Gulf coasts, I began to realize private companies could do the job. Earlier the
Corps had privatized the pipeline and barge business, so a precedent existed. The impetus to
move came when severe personnel cuts were imposed on the Corps' workforce.
Even so, there was considerable resistance from within the Corps and surprisingly from
without as well. The dredging industry was very skeptical of the Corps' intent and was not
anxious to invest millions of dollars in building new dredges without some assurance that
work would be forthcoming. Another obstacle arose when plans to upgrade the Corps' ancient
dredge fleet became known.
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