Enaineer Memoirs
They had never worked together. Many knew each other, but they'd never worked as a team.
The rules of the road were different. So getting the office organized was a tough job. Jack
had the task. The two outsiders, the U.S. Air Force and the Israelis, became very
impatient. They wanted a lot of things to happen more quickly than was the case.
In hindsight, I don't think we protected
enough.
was a colonel; the counterparts
were brigadier generals. His flank was overexposed. Instead of being able to concentrate
entirely on getting his office organized, he had to deal daily with these externalities. As a
consequence, I sent Brigadier General Max Noah from Huntsville to set up the management
information systems and to help Jack. Max did his job. The contention was that if we'd had
a general out there to deal with those other generals, it would have made all the difference in
the world. I don't think it would have made much difference because the initial distractions
for his performance,
for the project manager would not have changed. I admire
perseverance, and objectivity.
Start-up was a major problem. Then General Lewis had problems with some of the Corps
individuals and he wanted me to replace them. I finally had to tell Ben, "I don't know where
we're going to get better people. We've sent the best we had. Unless there's some disciplinary
problem, our best bet is to train those into a team rather than sending new people out." I went
to Israel in January 1980 and told our people that I would be back in August and left four or
five things to be done. Many were nervous about losing their jobs so I announced to the
groups that, "absent some difficulty with the Israeli government or some disciplinary problem,
you're the people who are going to get this job done." Afterwards, our people settled down.
went back in August. John Wall was there by this time, and the management information
systems were beginning to work.
To emphasize Jack
problem, I found that every time I went to Israel I had trouble
with the Air Force and the Israeli generals assigned to the project. They kept hammering on
all the things that were too slow or going wrong with the Corps' operation. They were tough
and I rarely had a chance to say anything. One day we were supposed to go see the Minister
of Defense, Mr. Ezer Weizmann. After lecturing me for about 30 to 40 minutes, the Israeli
brigadier general indicated we had to leave. I asked where we were going. They indicated we
were going to go see the Minister of Defense. I said, "Hold it. Since I haven't had a chance
to say anything, I am sure we are going to be a little late."
When we got over to the minister's office I raised the relationship problem. I said, in effect,
that he had bought a Chevrolet and now we were going down the road about 50 miles an hour
and somebody decided he wanted a Ford. If you want to stop long enough to let me off, it's
okay, but if we're going to continue we'd better figure out how to work together.
Mr. Weizmann acknowledged the Israelis could not do this job. He said words to the effect
that he didn't think anybody in the world could do it except the Army Corps of Engineers.
That's what he had asked for, that's what he got and was going to keep them. He gave the
Corps a big pep talk, and that was the end of that. So when it's all said and done, the Israeli
airfield job was, I think, a great challenge to all the key people involved. Everybody had to
work hard, and they did and I include all the players-U.S. Air Force, Israelis, Corps of
Engineers, and contractor personnel. The level of concentration and loyalty of the Corps'
group in Israel sets a standard, in my judgment. In spite of all the pressures, all the difficulties,
they put this job together; and they got it done on time, generally within the budget, and with
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