John W. Morris
in Israel a couple of fields that were in the Sinai before that area was returned to the
Egyptians.
Well, by the time I got home, General Bumell, the deputy, had gotten things well organized.
He'd sent some people to Israeli already.
So that was the beginning of the Israeli job, the airfield job, which turned out, in my
judgment, to be the most difficult single project during my term in theCorps. Before I leave
Saudi, we should discuss a few lessons learned from the standpoint of contract management.
The Saudis would, of course, determine the program and they would approve the design. We
had no objection if they suggested contractors who might bid on a job, but the Corps
definitely objected to any influence being exerted by the Saudis on who was to be selected to
do the job. Until very late in the program, that was never an issue. The Saudis respected that
and we didn't have any problem.
When the King Khalid Military City came along, we had to select a contractor to build the
infrastructure-the roads, the water system, quarries, et cetera-and then to operate and
maintain those for the major contractors who were to build the facilities. The infrastructure
contract was highly competitive and very expensive for the bidders to prepare proposals. After
several iterations, meetings, and reviews, we derived a short list of contractors whom we
wanted to go to the next go-round.
At the last review there were two critical issues: one was how to organize and manage the job
and two was how to handle the materials going to the job site. The second point proved quite
simple. The freight forwarder, whoever moved the materials from the United States to the
project, would be responsible from the time they were picked up in the States until the time
they were turned over to the using contractor at the job site. That meant through all the ports
and in and out of the customs and then reshipped in Saudi from water to land, et cetera. That
was a tough requirement for the freight forwarders. That allowed us to deal with the
contractor because his risks were defined a little more clearly than if he had to pick materials
up at the port.
The next question, though, was management. We wanted to be sure that the contractor had
proven experience in managing complex projects. We had some excellent competition. We
were just about to make the final decision when we got a call from the Saudis saying they
wanted a certain U.S. firm to be allowed to bid on the job.
I objected to being told to give favored consideration at that late date and that it was a
violation of our understanding that the Saudis would not try to influence the selection process.
The fact is, I felt so strongly about it that I mentioned to the Defense Department that if the
Saudis insisted on forcing this issue, that I would suggest that they find another agency to
handle the Saudi program. The ship had already left the port, for all practical purposes, and
there was no way to get this new firm into the system in any reasonable way. As it turned out,
the president of the company came to Washington. I briefed him on the whole situation. I
noted that there really was no way to get a new bidder at that point in time and still be fair.
Actually I would have been happy if the timing were different. He agreed and asked that his
company be withdrawn from consideration. That was the end of the problem.
The contract went to Morrison Knudsen for about 0 million. I may have mentioned earlier,
when the time came up two years later for renewal, Morrison Knudsen indicated they did not
want to bid it. They felt they'd lost money. I asked them to bid since they were already there.
They did. Sam Whan came along with a bid that was significantly less. Sam Whan is still
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