Enaineer Memoirs
down, that would have been the end of it because his decision is irrevocable. The division
engineer's position could be evaluated. General Gribble studied the matter and turned it over
to me for a recommendation.
I took the file and spent the entire weekend with it. Finally, I recommended the Chief approve
finishing Area C since most of the damage had been done and to disapprove the application
for Areas B and D. My rationale was simple. By law, every state was required to have a
coastal zone management plan. The state of Florida had not yet complied with that law. The
governor of Florida had said that if this permit were issued, he would not allow any more
destruction of the red mangrove. In the absence of a state law or a plan, there was no reason
to think that the next governor would be bound by this governor's conclusions. So my
rationale was that until the state of Florida had a coastal zone management plan, the federal
government should exercise its position and deny the permit even though the governor wanted
it to be issued. My belief was that a well-conceived coastal zone management plan would
include necessary safeguards for red mangroves.
That decision created quite a stir when announced. It was a landmark decision, and it did have
a lot to do with the coastal zone management plan program. You may recall that during my
Civil Works times we made several landmark decisions on permits. I don't think we should
try to cover them all-Bald Head Island, Block M, and a series of them. Marco Island was
only one, but one of the more dynamic because of the money that was involved in building
Marco Island and the political aspects.
General Gribble sustained the recommendation, and that's the way it came out as I can recall.
I don't know what's happened since then.
Q ..
Lock and Dam 26 came up again when you were deputy.
A
As deputy, I was chairman of the Board of Engineers for Rivers and Harbors. It seemed that
no matter where I went, Lock and Dam 26 followed along. Lock and Dam 26 arrived at the
board for evaluation when I did. There were two key issues. One, of course, was the
hullabaloo about a
channel. The design called for 12 feet of water over the sill to
allow a tow to go in and out of the lock safely even though the river depth was for a 9-foot
channel. The additional 3 feet caused the opponents to claim the Corps was going to make the
river channel 12 feet deep and increase the tonnage. That was one part of the problem.
The project before the Board of Engineers for Rivers and Harbors included a 110 by
foot lock on the Illinois side near
and another 110 by 600-foot lock on the Missouri
side. As you recall, the Corps did not have authority to build a structure which would increase
the capacity of the waterway. Congressional authorization would be required.
The studies had shown that the projected traffic would require a second lock in years to come,
but the current need required only the 1,200-foot lock. So technically speaking, we couldn't
go for the second lock without having analyzed the impact of the extra traffic on the
waterway. We knew that the 1,200-foot lock was okay because it wouldn't allow the traffic
to be increased on the upper Mississippi beyond the old Lock and Dam 26 capacity.
So the problem was how to structure the language in the legislation that would accommodate
the second lock without violating the NEPA, which required an environmental impact
statement before authorization of a federally sponsored project.
As you recall, this Lock and Dam 26 project problem started while I was director of Civil
Works. It didn't end until after I became deputy chief. I finally took the language problem
home and drafted wording which was ultimately okayed by our counsel. It didn't authorize
a second lock but allowed Congress to recognize that at some future date there might be a
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