John W. Morris
Q:
So the 18th Brigade was supporting the LOC program?
A:
The LOC program was a factor. First, however, was the support of the combat divisions. This was
an organizational decision. In other words, a specific combat battalion was aligned with a major
troop unit. The 20th Engineer Battalion was designated to support the 4th Infantry Division for
example. It was then up to the battalion commander of the 20th to liaise with the engineer
battalion commander of the 4th Infantry Division, which happened to be Lieutenant Colonel Vald
Heiberg. I would advise the division commander which 18th Brigade battalion was to provide
support and that his needs would take priority over anything else. Once arranged, the divisional
support plan worked well.
The LOC program took more brigade-level leadership, management, and attention. We met at
least weekly to discuss progress, deadlines, equipment needs, supplies, parts, et cetera, and the
weather. The monsoons presented unique problems for the engineers. From October through
January much work would be lost, equipment and campsites drenched, et cetera and, of course,
disruption of LOC completion plans.
Then evening activities occurred. Our headquarters area was secured by a Korean infantry
regiment. The Korean regiment was an excellent unit. One night the Vietcong threw satchel
charges into the wards at Cam Ranh Hospital. You may remember that. [Lieutenant] General
[Charles A.] Cochran was the corps commander, and when I saw him a week or so later, he
seemed upset. I didn't know why so I asked him. He felt I had allowed the Vietcong to get into
the hospital there.
Although security was a mission of the Korean infantry, I was the senior officer of the area, and
therefore he looked to me to do something about it.
I then took over the job and became responsible for the security. It was never ordered or anything,
but the Korean regimental commander understood he had to respond to me. As it happened, our
brigade camp was hit frequently because we were near the Vietcong trail between the hills and
the coast. They'd lob stuff at us, and every time they'd hit us, this Korean colonel would come
over with a gift. I had a whole roomful of gifts before it was all over.
The Korean regimental commander, although very conscientious about his work, couldn't keep
the Vietcong from firing a couple of rounds at us every couple of nights.
In 1969, the 18th Brigade headquarters didn't have an officers' club or lounge. So the officers got
together and built what would be an officers lounge. Really, it was not much bigger than this
room we're in now, maybe 20 by 10 or 15.
Anyhow, the night we opened it, we invited some local friends to come over in the afternoon to
christen this club. Well, I guess the Vietcong were upset because they were not invited. We no
sooner got in the club than they whammed one right in on top of us. Fortunately they didn't have
very good aim, but the club was a very nervous place to be for the next couple of weeks.
Occasionally I would go to Saigon to meetings with General Parker. I'd stay with him in his
hutch, his place. The 20th Brigade was commanded by Hal Parfitt, General Parfitt. His sergeant
major was Van Autreve, whom I mentioned earlier as a first sergeant in the 8th Engineers when
I was the battalion commander in Korea some years earlier. The 20th Brigade was later
commanded by Ed O'Donald, Brigadier General O'Donald, who would replace me in Omaha in
a few years.
The 18th and 20th were competitors to see who could build the most roads.
program
was to build one kilometer of road a day-" A
a Day." The 18th worked on a monthly, not
75
Previous Page
