Memoirs
As I understand it, attempts to make a selection proceeded, with each service holding
out for its own nominee. Apparently, I was the only one of the nominees who was
known to more than one of the services. Because of my association with the Air Force
in Greenland, the ballistic missiles Titan II program, and the Southwestern Division,
finally a compromise was reached, with me being designated. So that, as far as I know,
is the background of how I happened to be chosen. All this went on without my being
aware of it. Time magazine ran me down while I was on a few days' leave in Illinois
and carried a story about the assignment.
Q ..
You referred to this position as being the "construction czar."
A ..
That was somebody else's term, not mine.
.
Q.
Yes, I know. You were also characterized at one point as [Robert] McNamara's "straw
boss" in Vietnam. You had indicated earlier that this position was an attempt to
coordinate requirements in Vietnam rather than have each service's program go back
to Washington through its own channels. You don't have to answer this right now, but
I am interested in
attempts to control the situation. How personally
involved was he?
Oh, I have impressions. Certainly there was, in my opinion, far too much control from
A
Washington in everything that went on over there-not just in the construction
program but in the detailed approval of individual air targets, [involvement in] details
of deployment of troops, and many other aspects that made this war far different from
any other war. Of course, this was made possible by extraordinary communication
facilities.
As to the construction program, during the early days of U.S. involvement, when
Americans were simply serving as advisers, each individual service developed its
construction requirements and passed them back through its own chain of command.
We were operating in a peacetime system with construction projects going through the
appropriate services; through DOD,
and to the Congress for approval,
authorization, and
then back through a very extended chain; which obviously
wouldn't work with the short-term demand of a wartime situation.
The primary difficulty in Vietnam, as requirements with the increased U. S. strength in
Vietnam, was the necessity to set priorities because of the extremely limited
construction capability in country. There was one construction contractor combine,
then in the process of being increased in capacity. There was also a limited engineer
troop construction capability as represented by a few Army engineer units and Navy
seabee battalions.
IO2
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