Engineer Memoirs
A
The main events were influenced by the German counteroffensive. One thing that stands
out was the very heavy use of aircraft on1 January 1945, when the German air force
essentially appeared for the last time. They really massed their aircraft in support of
their operation. This resulted in one of the heavier air attacks of the war as far as our
unit was concerned. We also were in the path through which the German
or
malfunctions, and several fell in
"buzz bombs" flew toward
These often
our area. The engineers had the problem of making repairs, cleaning up the debris, and
protecting some major installations to minimize the possible damage. It was also
winter-a very cold and disagreeable winter.
I would say that one of the things I remember is the fact that we really weren't prepared
with proper clothing for continued operation in that kind of climate. Later, in Korea
better equipment and clothing for cold-weather operations were available.
The cold and its effect on people were primary problems. We did put in a Bailey bridge.
One of the few times that the 105th Engineer Battalion itself erected a Bailey bridge
was as a part of our counteroffensive in the Battle of the Bulge. We had quite an
exposed location and put in the bridge during the night in weather well below freezing
with snow on the ground. This was an acid test of the training that our unit had in
Bailey
erection. Although, as I say, most of this type of bridging was done by
supporting corps units.
Finding mines in the frozen ground under the snow was the other big engineer problem.
We tried using some of the mine-clearing devices with heavy rollers and flails on tanks
as a means of exploding mines that we could not otherwise find. While in defensive
positions along the northern flank waiting to begin the counterattack, we also
developed. a mine strategy for our division. On my recommendation, the division
commander, over objections from some of the regimental commanders, decreed that
all defensive mines would be emplaced on a temporary basis with no booby traps used.
This made it
to cover minefields with small-arms fire but was dictated by
the fact that we anticipated going over to the offensive soon.
We recognized ahead of time the problems that would be encountered in our attempts
to get through our own minefields and the casualties that would occur as we began the
offensive. We felt it was worth giving up a little bit on the defensive in order to be able
to move more rapidly forward once we began the counterattack. I believe that this was
a wise move, and it did pay dividends when we went on the offensive.
Q ..
What would account for the problem of not being prepared for the cold?
This is purely my opinion, but I think that we really just hadn't developed our
A
weather gear to the point where we were prepared to support major ground units under
these conditions. We obviously had wool uniforms, which were the normal wear, but
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