Ernest Graves
I think the Israelis were encouraged to pursue this because Paul Hartung shifted his
position to be that of an intermediary. One of the reasons that came about was the way
in which the whole thing was set up. Hartung himself did not have as great a voice in
the management of the construction as he probably had thought he would back in April
of '79.
The Corps came into this thing with the idea that Paul Hartung would have the same
role as the AFRCE [Air Force Regional Civil Engineer] normally does, which is a very
strong voice in requirements, but little or no voice in management of the construction.
Hartung, on the other hand, had the attitude that he was the project manager and this
should give him a voice in the management of the job. All of this led to a lot of
argument. If they had stuck by the agreement, there wouldn't have been an argument.
But that's very typical of working with Israel. If you indicate a willingness to
accommodate their views, they will keep using that to whatever limit they can because
they've had to scratch a lot. Whenever they're in a relationship with anybody, they're
scratching.
Some people criticize them for this. I don't think you should criticize them because I
think that's the way they've survived. The criticism is of the people that have agreed
to this. What you need to do is say, "Fine, but, you know, that isn't the way that it is."
And if they come to realize that it isn't that way, then they'll stop. They won't waste
effort there. They'll go over some other place where there are people that will give way.
Q:
Is what you have then, in this case, a situation where the negotiations actually are
ongoing, even after the negotiations are done?
A:
The answer is that in every international relationship, the negotiations never end. I don't
care whether it's with Saudi Arabia or Japan or Korea or Germany or you-name-it. We
had 75 customers and the negotiations were continual.
There is a problem in that not everybody sees it this way. Perhaps the Corps didn't
completely see it this way either and got into a little trouble that way. But, no. That's
par for the course. It's just one big negotiation. And the agreement is just one step. It's
an important leg up. But it doesn't solve the whole problem.
Did you read Stephen Rosenfeld's essay yesterday morning in the Washington Post
Q:
[Sunday, 31 March 1985] on Jimmy Carter's new book? It's in Book World, and it was
on the front page. You know his new book, The Blood of Abraham? And Rosenfeld
says--I don't know how he knows because he hasn't negotiated
especially--negotiating with the Israelis seems to him a process by which you get
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