Memoirs
about publishing the book, and after agreeing to do so, gave me many good
suggestions.
The book was originally scheduled for publication on November 15, 1992. But
when Margiotta saw that a draft chapter was critical of President Bush, he
advanced the publication date to October 1. He wanted the book to be in the
bookstores during the final weeks of the presidential campaign. When I submitted
my manuscript on May 15, I had no idea who the Democratic candidate would be.
The chapter on President Bush was written more in sorrow than in anger. I was
disappointed that he had not taken a more forthright stand on foreign policy, did
not stress fixing the domestic economy, and was conducting a poor campaign. The
net result, of course, was that William Clinton was elected.
Before the election I tried to get President Bush and candidate Clinton to pay more
attention to foreign policy, and in particular to the deteriorating state of affaris in
Russia. After the election, I talked to several persons close to President Clinton
to try to get him to pay more attention to the coming crisis in Russia. I was
worried that without support of the United States Yeltsin would be further rebuff4
by the Soviet Parliament and Congress of Deputies. I feared that Yeltsin might
lose out at the meeting of the Congress of Peoples Deputies on December 5, 1992.
In order to placate his opponents, Yeltsin dismissed his acting premier, Yegor
Gaidar, who had been his principal advisor on economic matters. In an effort to
be conciliatory, Yeltsin took the extraordinary step of giving the parliament the
right of veto over his selection of principal cabinet officers. Yeltsin barely
survived the parliamentary crisis in early December.
I continued to talk to several persons-Note: they have asked me to protect their
anonyrnity-who later became officials in the Clinton administration, urging them
to persuade the President to show support for Yeltsin. In March Yeltsin, sensing
that he was losing control of the situation, called for a referendum on April 25,
1993, at which Russian citizens could vote him in or out.
The parliament, however, trumped his ace. They added three more questions to
the referendum ballot. One question was whether the people had confidence in
Yeltsin's economic policies. A second question was whether new presidential
elections should be held. The final question was whether there should be elections
for a new parliament. The parliament cleverly protected itself on the last two
questions. To be valid, the parliament ruled, there would have to be a majority of
not only those who voted, but of all persons eligible to vote. The parliament was
safe because this was not, of course, even a remote possibility.
Fortunately, President Clinton, who had up to this point remained passive, now
sprang into action. During a meeting with Yeltsin in Vancouver in early April,
192
Previous Page
