Engineer Memoirs
that the Soviets would be interested in conventional arms control. They do not
need, nor do they want, large conventional forces. But, as Akhromeyev told me,
the Soviets will make only token cuts in their strategic forces. Without a stockpile
of nuclear weapons, Russia cannot remain a superpower. I believe, therefore, that
arms control will continue in both the conventional and strategic fields. But we
would be well advised, however, to continue to negotiate in several other important
fields. We should try to limit nuclear proliferation and we should try to reduce,
and if possible eliminate, biological and chemical weapons.
The Communist Party, as I predicted it would, has disintegrated. The Communist
system, still trying to revive itself, may continue to exist on life support machines.
But the system is brain dead. I, for one, am not overly worried about the breakup
of the Soviet Union. While we need to treat the question of control of nuclear
weapons carefully, I do not think it is a major problem. Yeltsin, who has over 90
percent of the Soviet Union's nuclear missiles in the Russian republic, is smart
enough to keep strict controls on them. I believe, therefore, that this problem is
manageable.
We should, therefore, adopt a wait-and-see attitude about what happens within the
Soviet Union. I believe that we should not give massive economic aid to the
Soviets. I disagree with President Bush that the fragmentation of the Soviet Union
will be a disaster. I also feel that he waited entirely too long to establish
diplomatic relations with the Baltics. But for the most part, I believe that President
Bush's inclination to be cautious and prudent is not the right solution for our
dealing with the republics of the former Soviet Union. We should work with
President Yeltsin to see that he brings about democracy and a free market economy
to Russia.
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