Edward L. Rowny
Q ..
Is that what is called MIRVing?
A ..
Yes. Since the Soviets had a monopoly on heavy missiles and we had none, it
meant that they had about 6,000 intercontinental ballistic missile warheads to our
2,000, a 3 to 1 advantage. Moreover, they had about a 3 1/2 to 1 advantage in
throw-weight, a measure of the destructive power of the warheads.
In all fairness, I should mention that Secretary Brown recognized what was going
on. Before the end of the Carter administration, Brown saw to it that we began
modernizing our own missiles. Down the road we would overcome some of the
disadvantages caused by the unrelenting Soviet modernization program. One of the
main reasons why the Soviets gained such a large advantage over us was that we
put a small number of warheads on our ICBMs while the Soviets put more
warheads on theirs. Our largest ICBMs, the Minuteman II and Minuteman III,
have one and three warheads, respectively. However, the smallest of the Soviet
systems, the SS-17, had four warheads, the SS-19 had six warheads, and the
SS-18 had ten warheads. Added to their 3 to 1 advantage in warheads was their
3 1/2 to 1 advantage in throw-weight. More throw-weight allowed them to get
better gyros and guidance mechanisms. This translated into improved accuracy.
Originally we thought that it was not important how many warheads they had
because we had the qualitative advantage due to the accuracy of our missiles. But
now that the Soviets had caught up to us in accuracy, the numbers of warheads
became very important.
In sum, I felt SALT II was not in our best interest. As I pointed out to the chiefs
and to Secretary Vance, I was breaking with SALT II not because I was against
arms control. In fact, I favored arms control agreements. However, the provisions
now being adopted would establish precedents from which we could not recover in
,
the future. As I told the chiefs, a modest step is not a useful one if you are unable
to take two successive steps across a chasm. You would only fall into it.
Accordingly, I saw a SALT II treaty emerging which would be against our security
interests.
Q ..
Did you get any support for your views?
A.
I was supported, at least for the time being, by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I also had
the support of the representative of the Secretary of Defense. But the
representatives of the State Department and the Arms Control Agency were very
powerful opponents on the other side and generally carried the day.
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