was named Carter's national security advisor. I had known Brzezinski when he
was a professor at Columbia and felt he could be counted upon to support our
national interests. In the end I decided to give up the civilian job offer and not
retire from the Army.
However, the honeymoon didn't last very long. The Secretary of Defense, Hal
Brown, said that if I were the only military representative, it would unbalance
things at the negotiating table. The State Department and ACDA would have two
votes while the Defense Department would have only one. Moreover, he said,
since I had worked rather well with Walter Slocombe, we would make a closely
knit team. He withdrew the offer that I be the sole military representative and said
that I would revert to my former position as the Joint Chiefs of Staff representative.
However, Secretary Vance upheld his commitment that I would go with him to the
ministerials. And George Brown said that I would not only be the chiefs'
representative but their principal advisor on arms control matters.
I considered quitting, but again I decided to stay on. The main reason was that I
was given two hats, not only would I represent the chiefs at the negotiating table
but would be their principal advisor. When I was in Washington, I would attend
meetings of the National Security Council with the chairman. When I was in
Geneva, I would at times simply cable my advice. At other times, when the issues
were important, I would travel back to Washington and join the deliberations at
National Security Council meetings. This put me in a unique position. Because
I knew the background of what was happening in Washington, I was in a better
position to know the ins and outs of what the White House was thinking, more so
than the chief negotiator himself. Moreover, the chief negotiator, Paul Warnke,
was dividing his time between being the director of the Arms Control Agency and
the chief negotiator, each a full-time job. Wamke soon learned he couldn't do
both jobs and left most of the negotiating in Geneva to his deputy, Ralph Earle.
In my dual-hatted position I definitely had more inside knowledge than Earle.
In my capacity as principal advisor to the Chiefs of Staff, I made annual estimates
on where we were going in the SALT talks. I presented them both orally and in
writing. In December of 1977 I wrote a rather pessimistic report to the chiefs
saying that I did not think that the emerging treaty, if it were to continue along the
lines it was then headed, would be in our national interest. The chiefs took note
of my estimate and agreed with me. They said, however, that I should work hard
at trying to repair the damage and to help make the treaty come out right.
Nevertheless, the situation continued to deteriorate, mostly because the Carter
administration, in general, and Paul Warnke, in particular, were willing to make
more compromises than the chiefs thought were desirable.
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