Edward L. Rowny
A
There was not as much opportunity to do things in the 24th Division as there had
been in Vietnam or with the 11th Air Assault Division tests. Europe was more
stable and concentrated on trying to contain attacks launched by the Warsaw Pact.
But wherever we could, we tried to add more mobility, and I tried to get more
helicopters than the 100-odd assigned to the division. A number of us who
commanded units in Europe also pushed for lighter vehicles and lighter armored
personnel carriers. But the situation didn't lend itself to a lot of free-wheeling or
experimentation. Changes had to be made slowly, and then only after a great deal
of study and staffing. We did, however, have a sympathetic Army commander in
the person of General Andrew P. O'Meara. He believed that at some stage nuclear
weapons would be used tactically, and as a result constantly pushed the idea that
we had to be ready to exploit tactical nuclear weapons. And in this connection, he
believed that helicopters would be highly useful on a nuclear battlefield. But there
was very little sympathy in the Army staff for the notion of using tactical nuclear
weapons. In addition, once we left Vietnam, the Army's enthusiasm for helicopters
began to wane.
Q ..
Well, let me get back to your tour in ACSFOR. How did your work and that of
Kinnard with the 1 lth Air Assault Division progress?
A
My work in ACSFOR, despite the handicaps, continued to progress. I had a small
but highly loyal staff. In addition to Frank Clay, I had an outstanding officer,
Colonel William "Bill" Terrell, who worked wonders. These officers helped me
get others within the Army staff to moonlight for us. We held frequent meetings
to which we invited Harry Kinnard, Jack Norton, Phil Seneff, John Tolson, Bob
Williams, and others. I also encouraged a number of McNamara's whiz kids like
Harry Rowan and Alain Enthoven, to pay frequent visits to Kinnard's division,
especially when they were conducting exercises.
Once the Secretary of Defense decided in early 1965 that he wanted the 11th Air
Assault Division to go to Vietnam, things went into high gear. Tests were
accelerated and equipment designed for Europe, for example, the Little John
Battalion, was dropped from the division's TOE. To dampen criticism from the
Air Force, the division was stripped of its Mohawks. Tests now concentrated on
how the division would operate in the central highlands of Vietnam. However,
some tests simulated operating in the Delta and I and III Corps areas.
On June 11, 1965, Secretary McNamara announced at a nationally televised press
conference that the 11th Air Assault Division would be redesignated an air mobile
division and deployed to Vietnam. It would become the 1st Air Cavalry Division,
carrying the colors of the 1st Cavalry then in Korea. The 2d Infantry Division
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