to fight counterinsurgency operations. A year later, sometime in 1964, Kinnard
was instructed to include tests simulating action against the Viet Cong.
Q ..
Were these tests successful?
A ..
Yes, they were highly successful. The test division conducted simulated attacks
and defense in Europe where they were pitted against the 82d Airborne Division
and other regular U.S. Army units. When it branched out into counterinsurgency
operations, it was also highly successful. Kinnard read the Howze Board and
ACTIV test results carefully and tried to get as many officers and men as possible
who had been in these tests assigned to his division.
Q ..
Well, to get back to your time at ACSFOR, can you tell me something about the
dynamics within the Army staff?
General Ben Harrel, chief of ACSFOR, was very ambitious. He was a friend of
A
General Johnson who was then DCSOPS. Harrel knew that Johnson was a protege
of General Bus Wheeler, the chief of staff. Harrel was right; Johnson followed
Wheeler as the chief of staff of the Army. General Ralph Haines, one of Harrel's
deputies, was also quite close to Johnson. Haines was an armor officer who came
to ACSFOR under a cloud of criticism. He had been charged by the General
Accounting Office [GAO] with doing a poor job when he commanded a division
in Europe. However, Haines was very clever. With the help of the ACSFOR staff
and with the backing of Johnson, Haines turned the report around so the GAO
report was quashed. General Abrams, the other deputy to Harrel was, like Haines,
an armor officer. But Abrams was a straight-shooter and much easier to work with
than Haines or Harrel.
One of the difficulties of my position was that Secretary Vance wanted to keep
abreast of the work being done on air mobility and sent for me often to be briefed.
Even though I reported to Harrel whenever I was sent for, and always debriefed
him and his two deputies, I was accused by Harrel of end-running my immediate
superiors. I explained this to Secretary Vance, but he refused to believe that these
officers would put obstacles in my way or accuse me of jumping channels. I asked
Vance to let me brief Harrel and let him in turn brief Vance; but Vance would have
none of it. He wanted his reports from the "horse's mouth?
Vance, in what he thought was a promotion, directed the Army to make me a third
deputy to Harrel. On paper this looked like a good idea. It was supposed to give
me access to the entire ACSFOR organization which was theoretically to support
me. But in practice it did not work that way. My staff of about 30 officers was