Edward L. Rowny
This planning for the retraining of the occupation force and the Japanese Self
Defense Force was done bv a rather small number of officers. As I recall, there
were not more than eight or nine officers in the entire plans section.
Q ..
Did you work in both the military and civilian side of MacArthur's staff?
A ..
No, I worked exclusively on the military side. But I made friends with a number
of planners in the civilian side through Doctor Morrow with whom I had traveled
around Japan. I was fascinated with the way General MacArthur's civilian staff,
SCAP [Supreme Commander, Allied Powers] was restructuring the entire political,
social and economic fabric of the Japanese government. This staff contained a
number of the best minds in the United States-all experts and highly regarded in
MacArthur was revolutionizing-and this is an
their respective fields.
understatement-the entire Japanese society. He drew up a new constitution,
redesigned the judiciary and economic systems, and set up industrial standards.
The Japanese industry had a very low reputation up to that time because of shoddy
workmanship and low standards of quality. MacArthur turned all that around; in
fact, the Toyotas and Sonys which are so reliably built today can trace their success
to MacArthur's directives.
Q ..
Did you get involved in drawing up the peace treaty or the constitution?
A ..
No. These were done on the civilian side of the headquarters. We in FECOM [ F a r
East Command], the military side, coordinated with the civilians, but the drafting
of the peace treaty and constitution were assigned to SCAP.
Q ..
On January 5, 1950, the President made a statement on Taiwan in which he said,
essentially, that there would be no military assistance given to Chiang Kai-Shek.
And shortly thereafter, Dean Acheson made a statement on Korea to the
Washington Press Club on January 12 saying that Korea and Formosa were beyond
the U.S. sphere of strategic influence. What reaction did these statements cause
in MacArthur's headquarters?
A
I don't recall any reaction to the President's statement. But I remember well how
stunned we were when Acheson made his public statement. It would have been one
thing to say privately among ourselves that Korea would no longer be within our
sphere of interest. But to say this publicly seemed to us the height of folly and
irresponsibility. We were shocked that anyone in a high place, and especially a
man with the reputation that Acheson enjoyed, would make such a statement.
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