- - - ineer Memoirs
Eng
Plans Officer, General Headquarters, FECOM
Q ..
When you graduated from Yale you went to the Far East. Where were you
assigned and what did you do?
I was sent to Japan to join the plans section of G-3 [plans and policy] of General
A
MacArthur's headquarters. There was an interesting windfall occasioned by my
early arrival. The officer I was replacing was not ready to leave and the
headquarters didn't want a long overlap. As a result I was given an open
ticket-air, rail and ship-to travel around Japan for 30 days. By coincidence, a
civilian historian-anthropologist Dr. Kenneth Morrow, had also planned a 30-day
tour. I enjoyed his company and profited a great deal from his expertise. We
started from Tokyo, then down the east coast of Japan, around the southern islands,
and up the west coast. We then went to Hokkaido and back down the east coast
to Tokyo.
Q ..
Was your trip strictly a pleasure trip or did you also look at military installations?
A ..
While my purpose was not to inspect or check on military installations, I could not
help but note the failings of the so-called "occupation force." There were small
detachments of U.S. troops in every village and hamlet not serving any useful
function. There was no need for occupation forces in Japan because there was no
danger of a Japanese military revival. In fact, our troops were only interfering
with the Japanese civil authorities who were functioning well. General
MacArthur's instructions were carried out in the name of the emperor.
When I returned from the tour I wrote a trip report to General Almond, the chief
of staff to General MacArthur. I said that our so-called "occupation forces" were
not carrying out any real function; in fact, were interfering with the Japanese
civilian authorities. Almond directed Colonel Dewitt Armstrong, the G-3, to have
me make a study of the occupation. My recommendation that the troops be pulled
back to training camps for possible use elsewhere was approved. The "elsewhere"
I had in mind was, of course, Korea. To replace the occupation forces, I
recommended formation of "Japanese Self Defense Force," patterned after the U.S.
National Guard. Their mission would be to handle disasters and maintain law and
order.
In retrospect, the idea of pulling out our occupation forces didn't happen any too
soon. We were still pulling out the remainder of the troops in June 1950 when the
Korean War broke out. But we had been able to reassemble some of the troops
into regimental&e units which were available to go to Korea soon after the North
Koreans invaded South Korea.
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