Marche) scoffed at reports of activity at Hotton, Colonel
Fraser put the Hotton telephone close to the Marche line
to allow the 84th to hear the sounds of shelling at
Hotton. Finally, at about 0830, he went to Hotton himself.
In order to coordinate the activities of his battalion
with what the 3d Armored Division was doing on the other
side of the river, Colonel Fraser crossed the bridge and
was isolated in the enemy territory for much of the
morning after the enemy armored spearhead started to
advance toward the bridge. He made his way back safely,
saw that Captain Hodges had the situation well under
control, and then proceeded to Marche to recheck with the
84th Division on reinforcements for Hotton.79
Meanwhile, Captain John W. Barnes, battalion S-3, was
off on another mission. After Captain Barnes had sent a
squad of volunteers from Headquarters and Service Company
to Hotton, he went down N4 to the outskirts of Marche,
where a Captain Siegal of the 523d Ordnance Battalion was
manning an Ml0 at one of the 51st's roadblocks. Captain
Barnes brought the Ml0 back through Marche toward Hotton
to reinforce the position there. He was stopped by the
commanding general of the 84th Division, to whom Captain
Barnes explained the situation.
According to Captain
Barnes, "General Alexander R. Bolling told me he wanted
facts and not rumors or hearsay and he would not allow me
to go on with the Ml0 until he knew more of the
General Bolling then dispatched one of his
situation."
reconnaissance officers in his personal armored car to
confirm the seriousness of the situation. When the 84th's
troops did arrive, however, it was already 1500 and the
battle was over.80
Captain Hodges states that the three most decisive
actions of the battle of Hotton were the manning of the
37-mm. AT gun by Private Ishmael, the effective firing
done by the stray tank of the 7th Armored Division, and
the bravery of an unknown, unnamed soldier who volunteered
42
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