were subjected to numerous minor probings by jeeps and
As with the remainder of the 51st
armored vehicles.
Engineer Combat Battalion, the successful defense of these
According to Colonel
roadblocks hinged on deception.
Fraser, it was due to "deceiving the enemy as to the
strength of my small, practically isolated force, in
spite of known superiority to my front and known enemy
infiltration to my rear." The significance of the defense
in the larger picture was that it enabled the 84th
Division to reorganize defensive positions around the city
of Marche and to keep that city out of enemy hands.62
The battle of Hotton occurred on 21 December. Just
before the enemy struck at the Hotton bridge, he attempted
to break through the Company A positions and at Hampteau
overcame resistance put up by a squad of Company A. The
Hampteau defense had been organized by Lieutenant Floyd D.
Wright, platoon leader of the 1st Platoon of Company A .
About 30 yards northeast of the footbridge across the
river, on the road to Soy, a minefield was hastily laid
and the position across the river was outposted with
Private Stanley A. Driggs and his Ml rifle. Thirty to 40
yards from the footbridge, on the southwest side of the
river, a bazooka team of three men and a detonator for the
bridge were placed. Along the Hotton-La Roche [Laroche]
road, two bazooka teams were placed 700 yards apart,
Two .50-caliber
protected by daisy chains of mines.
machine guns, half a squad of riflemen, and two tanks were
placed west of the Hotton-La Roche [Laroche] road.63
Three jeep patrols from the 820th Tank Destroyer
Battalion reported that they had received small arms fire
in the vicinity of La Roche [Laroche], that they had
relayed this information to the 2d Platoon of Company A at
Marcourt, and that the 2d Platoon had subsequently blown
their Marcourt bridge. After attempting unsuccessfully to
persuade the 820th to reinforce the 2d Platoon's roadblock
at Marcourt, Lieutenant Wright sent his platoon sergeant,
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