Engineer Memoirs _____________________________________________________________________
It worked magnificently, and the division leadership really extolled the virtues of EForce. In
their after-action reports, in their comments, the brigade commanders said, "Gosh, every time
I wanted an engineer, there he was. I always had my lieutenant colonel in the headquarters. I
was really getting the kind of support I needed."
So, Jack O'Neil and the 317th commander really made it happen, and I give the credit to Jack
O'Neil, who worked with the division staff and talked them into doing it.
On the other hand, the 1st Cav didn't. I flew up to visit them one day, and it was a night and
day difference from the 2d Armored. You'd fly out to the brigade headquarters in the 2d
Armored and Jack O'Neil, tied in, was right there in the brigade. You'd go out to the bridge
site, and there's the 2d Armored assistant division commander talking about how great things
are and how much he really liked this new EForce concept. I mean, everybody knew about
it.
Then we visited the 8th Engineer Battalion commander, 1st Cav Division, and he wasn't
even in the fight. He was far behind either of the brigades and so was his supporting Corps
engineer battalion, the 82d. Neither one of them was tied in with the rest of the combined
arms team. I mean, they were not a factor in the battle.
The 1st Cav had not gone to EForce. I don't know whether it was that General John
Yeosock, the division commander, thought it was unnecessary, or whether that engineer
battalion commander had not carried the mantle, as had to happen for success. I mean, it took
the division engineer to carry it in and say, "This is how we ought to do it." My thought was
in the 8th, he was not a factor in the division.
Out of that experience, General Saint was even more convinced. With the 2d Armored really
positive about EForce, the words went back, and so we had positive support out of
REFORGER '87.
We then began preparing for REFORGER in the fall of '88. By that time General Saint had
arrived as the Commander in Chief and I was Chief of Staff. So, once again we were working
to sell the Army leadership that EForce was the way to go.
I had gone back to the engineer commanders conference in May at Belvoir, that General
Reno hosted. General Thurman talked there and said, "What we're going to do with EForce
is have it go through the 7th Light Infantry Division validation process."
What had happened there was that, before they had established the 7th, they had developed
the concept of the light infantry division. They then organized the division and took it to the
National Training Center and tested their concept and then modified the organization
according to what they'd found.
So, General Thurman said, "That's what we're going to have to do to have EForce." Well,
that was a big obstacle. It was an opportunity, but it was an obstacle. I mean, it was an
opportunity because it sounded like now we had a path to succeed. Having been stymied here
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