________________________________________________________________________Richard S. Kem
So, in the first couple of weeks in the job I really found out that my action ramp had to
accelerate. I wasn't going to have a nice glide path into understanding what was required in
my new job. General Groves wanted answers now--and he was looking down the table at me
directly. It was one of those things where it was pretty plain that I had to seize the
responsibility and do it and pull it all together. So, I became the focal point for making things
happen for the USAREUR implementation of the rapid reinforcement of NATO initiative.
Probably the only way that worked was that I had direct access to General Groves, the Chief
of Staff. I could call his secretary, Marian O'Donnell, and say, "I really need to see General
Groves." I'd get five minutes, and I'd go in and say, "This is this and this is that," and I'd get
it--he'd say, "Drive on," or "Change direction," or "Go." I was involved in the thinking and
strategizing, and I had a validator. I had a high-placed somebody that could give the blessing
and I didn't have to wait a long time for that blessing.
I should back up here and give you an incident there that happened soon after I first arrived.
Major General Lou Prentiss was the DCSENGR and he changed out just six weeks later.
Major General Vald Heiberg replaced him. I remember after about the second week, after one
of my trips up to see General Groves in one of our private sessions, General Heiberg, who
had been out flying around, learning, visiting some of the people like you do when you first
arrive at a job, came back and said, "Well, don't you think you could come see me before
you go see General Groves?"
In sort of a flip response, but being sincere, I said, "We do need to succeed, and I don't think
we have the time to wait on your availability for these things, so, I mean, I'll keep you
informed, we'll let you know, but there will be times when, to keep things going, we're going
to have to get up there and get the Chief's blessing. I suggest we better have that modus
operandi." So, that continued and he didn't object and we had a great working relationship. I
believe I kept him informed.
Now, back to the example I was giving--where were division sets five and six to go? As
mentioned, I'd been up to General Groves and found out nobody had made a decision. Not
only that, no decision was pending. There was nothing operating to get a decision. So, I went
back to the office and wrote a message basically to the world, to the Supreme Allied
Commander, Secretary of Defense, EUCOM, to all the players, and said, "We've determined
that one set ought to be in Belgium and one set ought to be in the Netherlands in addition to
the set in Germany for the following reason: basically to share the pain. Need your decision
and coordinated positions. If you don't object by so-and-so date, we're going to go with it."
I walked that back up to General Groves. He signed it out, and the message went to the
world, and within a week it was the decision. I don't know if we ever got a message back
from anybody. It was just understood that that was the right way to do it. That was an
example of how we just had to make things happen.
Then the question came, "Well, where in the Netherlands?" I didn't have anybody to turn to.
So, we called up the defense staff in The Hague and said, "We want to meet with you and
pick sites." In the meantime, once the global site message had gone, we solicited SHAPE and
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