Engineer Memoirs _____________________________________________________________________
somebody, namely themselves. It was important that the '77 after-action report say just the
opposite and make the point so they could be brought on later. We also made the point that
we had to have the M9 ACE quickly in today's battle; the dozer and tractor-trailer
combination did not fit the heavy force battle.
We also made the point that engineers needed to have remotely delivered mines. Hand-
emplaced mines just took too long to put in. We made the point that our breaching
capabilities were inadequate and engineers in the heavy force critically needed a breaching
capability. We made the point that we had to have modern float bridges throughout the force.
We wanted to get them totally converted from the M4T6 and Bailey. We made the point that
the mix of Corps battalions and divisional battalions was only ad hoc and they really didn't
fit together. As we needed to operate to support heavy forces, what we really needed was
something like an engineer group or something like that within the division so there would
be an engineer battalion per maneuver brigade. That was the first statement at that time of
what would become the concept for EForce later. We made the point that we needed to have
more rapid terrain analysis capability from the topo folks available forward at Corps and in
the divisions.
As you can see, we made quite a number of telling points that were to improve the combat
engineers of today.
We made the point that we needed a permanent engineer at brigade level on the brigade staff.
We were doing things ad hoc by necessity. For instance, in the 3d Infantry Division, the
organic 10th Engineer Battalion headquarters would basically support one maneuver brigade
plus the commander would do his division responsibilities. Its direct support battalion, the
237th in wartime, would have its battalion headquarters support another maneuver brigade,
again with a mix of either the 237th or the 10th companies. Then they would take the
remaining companies and put them with the third maneuver brigade with a field grade officer
from each engineer battalion and set them up as an ad hoc battalion headquarters. That's how
they were trying to achieve, ad hoc, the requirement to support all three maneuver brigades
with a field grade headquarters and multiple companies. So, we made the point that that was
bad; we needed the engineers throughout--thus, this later became EForce.
We also made the point that we had to have an engineer at maneuver brigade headquarters all
the time, so the brigade commander would always get the engineer contribution into his
planning, his estimate of the situation, his concept of the operations, and the brigade's
execution. Later on, that became the brigade engineer position filled by a major.
So, out of the REFORGER '77 Carbon Edge field came the brigade engineer. Mechanization
took a step to the plus side instead of the minus side and became a happenstance several
years later. The M9 ACE picked up valuable field support that was later turned into messages
from Corps headquarters and USAREUR back to the Engineer School and the Army system
with high-level commanders saying, "I got to have the M9 ACE." Breaching was listed as a
critical heavy force inadequacy and the strong message was sent that things were amiss when
engineers had to ad hoc things between two battalions supporting a division.
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