Ernest Graves
operation with more time to get into place. This is a much greater challenge to the
battalions themselves that are doing the job because they have very large organizational
problems to support this type of highway construction.
As far as the challenge to the group on the LOC program is concerned, it was a
resource problem extending all the way up to the 20th Brigade, which was attempting
to come up with enough earth moving equipment to do the job in the available time.
[Q:
How did Speedy Express affect the later construction of QL4?]
A:
There's no question about the fact that Speedy Express had a serious adverse effect on
this year's LOC program. At a time when we should have been making all-out
preparations for the LOC program, we were doing Speedy Express. This was
aggravated by the fact that the operation was in a suspended state for a critical period.
We might have gone on to the LOCs had we known the fate of Speedy Express, but we
didn't know it until later--the end of February, I guess, would be the time when the
cancellation of the deployment of the Air Mobile Brigade was finally confirmed.
You've got to be honest about this thing. We originally started out trying to get
facilities ready in December. Then it was slipped to January, which was very fortunate
because we didn't have anything ready in December, and then it got deferred because
of the threat north of Saigon. This gave us a grace period because we weren't able
really to finish our Speedy Express work until the latter part of February and into
March. Chi Lang was finished the latter part of February. The work at Moc Hoa carried
on into March. Hindsight is better than foresight. If we'd known nothing was going to
happen, all this effort could have been put into the LOCs.
There's another aspect of it which is that the command and staff elements, with all their
attention focused on trying to do Speedy Express, just never got around to the planning
and decisions that were necessary for the LOC program.
I don't know whether this is generally appreciated, but no headquarters to the very
highest and no manager, no commander to the very highest can give equal attention to
every problem he has. If you have been in these situations, you can see that one problem
will be neglected in favor of another. There is no question, but the LOC program in the
delta was neglected because of the attention which had to be directed to Speedy
Express.
[Q:
Does QL4 fit into the overall excellent canal system of the area?]
A:
As to the relation between QL4 and the canal system, I'm not very knowledgeable
about this. My impression is that the two serve different purposes. I've always viewed
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