Engineer Memoirs
"Yes, you will,- he said. "You'll have a staff and will advise me on a regular
basis. You'll have access to me and will sit in on Cabinet meetings that deal with
arms control. I said I had difficulty seeing how my job would sit with other
agencies, the established bureaucracy. " I t will sit well with them because it is what
I want," he said.
I said I would need to be assured that I would have access to the National Security
Council and attend their meetings. He pushed a buzzer and soon Jim Baker, his
chief of staff, walked. in. "Jim, he said, "I've offered Rowny the job of being a
special advisor to me on arms control matters. I would also like him to advise the
Secretary of State. Rowny wants assurances that he is going to get into the act and
be a player?
Baker said, "Okay, we'll give Rowny support and guarantee him access.
I said that under the circumstances I'd take the job and see how it worked out. In
February 1985 I was officially designated special advisor to the President and
Secretary of State for arms control matters.
After I went to the first several meetings of the National Security Council, I could
see that the White House was true to its word. I was able to present my advice and
had a fairly high success rate at having it followed. Paul Nitze, who had been
given the same title, moved into an office close to the Secretary of State on the
seventh floor. Nitze became Schultz's right hand man on arms control as far as the
State Department was concerned. I stayed in my original office on the fourth floor
of the State Department. While I went to the more important meetings Schultz
called on arms control, I did not interact with Schultz on a day-to-day basis.
There was a minus and a plus side to my working arrangement with the secretary.
Nitze was an integral part of Schultz's staff; I was not. When Nitze made a
recommendation and it was turned down, Nitze accepted the decision and closed
ranks with the State Department. When one of my recommendations was turned
down, I would reevaluate the issue. If on further analysis I thought the State
position was correct, I would support it. If my analysis convinced me they were
wrong, I would write up my views and forward them to the President through the
National Security Advisor. I would always send a copy to the Secretary of State.
On some issues the President decided in State's favor, on others he sided with me.
In those instances where my views differed from State's, the decisions were about
50-50 in my favor.
I was able, therefore, to play an independent role, one which suited me better than
at the top than I had enjoyed as the START negotiator. While I missed the
Previous Page
