Engineer M m i s
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close coterie of trusted lieutenants who not only determined Reagan's policies but
decided who would be on his team. They felt threatened by Haig and decided to
move him out.
Q ..
In Reagan's first couple of years there were changes in Soviet leadership. Did this
have any influence on how your meetings were going?
A ..
Yes. Brezhnev died and was replaced by Yuri Andropov who didn't have very
long to live and was replaced by Konstantin Chemenko. We would no sooner get
started on negotiations than a new Soviet leader appeared on the scene. Still, there
was a great deal of continuity because all the negotiations were in the Brezhnev
mold and Gromyko remained Soviet Foreign Minister. The policies didn't change.
The Soviet negotiators continued to be obstinate, entirely one-sided. They were
not very forthcoming on any of the major issues. It was a difficult time to try to
make progress on arms control.
Q ..
Let's continue to talk about personalities. You've been dealing with the Russians
for almost 20 years now, haven't you?
A ..
Not quite; only since 1973.
Q ..
That's 17 years. During that time did you become close friends with any of the
Soviets?
A ..
Close friends would be too strong a way to put it. You certainly get to know your
counterparts quite well and you do develop a rapport with them. You learn how
far you can go and can, after a while, predict what they're going to do. But Soviet
officials do not make friends with foreigners. They're dedicated to their work and
are loyal to their superiors. One of the great disappointments of working with the
Soviets is that at best you can develop a working relationship with them. But even
then, this often changes overnight and the Soviets reverts to type. On the whole
I have a high respect for Soviet negotiators; they are professionals in their business.
But in terms of making any close or lasting friends, it just doesn't happen.
Q ..
Can you tell me something about where and how you conducted your negotiations?
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