Edward L. Rowny
a result of these basic experiments they introduced new techniques into Korea
which doubled their harvest. We sent for these studies and attempted to introduce
some of the same techniques in Vietnam. It was difficult, however, because in the
first place, communication was a problem. Second, traveling about the countryside
was dangerous. Third, there was great resistance to changing centuries-old habits.
As a net result, we did not accomplish any revolutionary changes. But we were
able to make a dent. One of the project's biggest values was that it raised the
morale of a number of village and hamlet chiefs.
Q ..
What about your second mission, that of experimenting in the military field?
A
Although arming helicopters was our main task, it was by no means our only
effort. For example, we placed single artillery pieces in villages where local
militiamen could fire against mass attacks. This turned out to be highly
controversial, since the Army's Artillery School taught that artillery should always
be massed and never deployed as single pieces. We did the same thing with
mortars. The ability of villagers to send up flares to light up the countryside when
terrorists were attacked at night and to fire artillery and mortars against attackers
proved a highly effective effort and did much to build morale.
Another idea we put into practice was to import a huge Weyerhauser tree cutting
machine. This machine, which was used in the U.S. to produce wood pulp, could
cut a swath through the jungle 10 yards wide at one pass. By cutting 5 0 - y a r d
swaths north and south and east and west through the jungle at intervals of one
kilometer, we were able to establish "killing zones. Trip wires and listening
devices would alert our artillery and helicopters whenever a band of guerrillas tried
to cross one of the killing zone swaths. It proved very effective at breaking up
enemy attacks.
We also experimented with air-cushion vehicles. The Army and Marine Corps
were at that time developing a platform built around a large fan. The fan, when
it worked properly, could transport 20 to 30 men rapidly over rice paddies,
swamps, and rivers. It was a good idea, but the fans were not powerful or rugged
enough to operate well.
One of our important programs was to train the younger and older men, those who
had not been drafted. We formed them into local militia units to help protect
village and hamlet chiefs. We set up programs whereby the Vietnamese army
taught these militia to shoot carbines. It was a risky business because the Viet
Cong targeted the militia in order to steal their weapons. But it was better than not
protecting the chiefs-and hence the villagers themselves-from attack. We
extended this program to the training of women. In some regions, especially in the
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