Edward L. Rowny
A ..
Yes, Norstad continued his dream sessions. One of the subjects we discussed, a
brainchild of Norstad's, was the evolution of NATO strategy from massive
retaliation to flexible response. Updating MC 14/2 to MC 14/3 was worked out
in detail by Colonel Richard "Dick" Stilwell, who later commanded our forces in
Korea as a four-star general. Norstad was a young and dynamic officer. I recall
he celebrated his 50th birthday while I was his secretary. He was an inspiring man
to work for and employed none of the high pressure tactics that General Gruenther
used.
Q ..
General Norstad must have ushered in a completely different atmosphere.
A ..
Yes. As I said earlier, the two SACEURs were effective but in different
ways-General Gruenther was effective with large audiences while Norstad was
effective with small ones. Gruenther believed that strategy would take care of
itself. He felt it was his job to look after the support for and morale within
NATO. Gruenther felt it important to have all the countries, and especially the
smaller ones, feel secure by being a part of one big family.
By way of contrast, General Norstad believed that if he developed a good strategy,
it was the best thing he could do for NATO. He felt his subordinates could take
care of details and could take charge of their own morale.
Q ..
Is there anything else you want to tell me about your assignment at SHAPE?
A ..
Yes. While at SHAPE I got interested in how decisions are made at high levels.
There were a number of studies being done in academia, especially Harvard and
Yale, on the decision-making process. Some of the ideas developed at that time
were applied later on, for example at the time of the Cuban missile crisis. The
decision-making process fascinated me, and I started gathering notes for what
culminated about 20 years later as my Ph.D. thesis on decision-making in NATO.
In my Ph.D. thesis on the decision-making process in NATO, I drew largely from
my notes taken at tours of duty then, and later, at NATO. I wrote that there were
three types of decisions made in NATO.
The easiest type of decisions were those that had to be made in times of crisis. I
learned this at first hand because during my first months in Brussels in 1970, I was
the deputy to General Johannes Steinhoff, commander of NATO's Military
Committee. Dom Mintoff, the prime minister of Malta, had Malta defect from
NATO the day I arrived in Brussels in 1970. On that same day, Steinhoff left for
a month's leave. The month of August is a dead month all over Europe. Yet,
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