Edward
Rowny
questions. In desperation, I said, "Captain, you obviously know a great deal about
nuclear weapons and how they might be used in ground warfare. Why don't you
come up to the platform and let us ask you questions?"
Unabashed, he did so, and for the next hour or so performed brilliantly. I invited
him home for dinner and we talked into the early hours of the morning. It was
only then that I learned that the young captain was a reserve officer performing his
two weeks of annual active duty. He was Congressman Henry M. "Scoop"
Jackson from Washington state, who later became a United States senator.
The next day I was called into General Fritchie's office, the acting commandant of
the Infantry School. He said the chief of staff of the Army wanted to see me in
Washington the next day. He had been called by Congressman Scoop Jackson.
Elated, I traveled to Washington, believing that I would be commended for my
innovative ideas. Instead, I was taken to task by the chief of staff, Robert Stevens,
for having "exacerbated the services' roles and missions fight." The Army, he told
me, had no interest in nuclear weapons. The same went for helicopters, he said;
they were the province of the Air Force. Moreover, he admonished me for
"putting Jackson up to calling him." I told him this was not so, but he said he
didn't believe me.
That marked the end of my unofficial teaching. I was ordered not to hold PROFIT
sessions, not even on an unofficial basis. There was simply too much interservice
rivalry over the use of nuclear weapons and combat helicopters. Accordingly, I
was silenced for the remainder of my stay at Benning. As for Scoop Jackson, the
episode did not faze him at all. More than once, at later times, he egged me into
sticking my neck out.
Jackson urged me to push both ideas: the use of nuclear weapons and combat
helicopters in the Army. He was instrumental in getting me assigned to Vietnam
where I introduced helicopters into combat and helped develop the Army's air
assault doctrine. My work with helicopters resulted in setting back my Army
career. Later, Jackson had me assigned as the JCS representative to the SALT II
negotiations.
It came about this way. In 1972 Jackson decided that General Royal Allison, the
Air Force general representing the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the SALT II talks, was
not doing a good job. Jackson felt Allison had undermined him when Allison
pushed hard for approval of the ABM treaty [antiballistic missile] and interim
accord on strategic offensive arms, SALT I. Jackson engineered a deal with Henry
Kissinger. Jackson told Kissinger he would vote for the ABM treaty and interim
agreement only if certain demands were met. One of these demands was that I
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